A Multinational Strategy for Containing the Houthis
The time has come to conceptualize a US-led multinational campaign against Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis. Either collective US-led military and economic pressure is applied to diminish and, for the time being, suppress Houthi aggression, or continued negligence will invariably pave the way for eventual Houthi dominance over the southern Arabian Peninsula.
In the past, the US has either relied on unilateral air power or assigned less capable and less decisive allies the task of containing, or even rolling back, advances made by the Houthi movement’s armed wing in Yemen. This will have to change. While the Trump administration has not been particularly adept at building coalitions through shrewd and careful diplomacy, the Yemen file cannot be addressed by the US alone, nor can it simply be handed off to allies who are ill-equipped or hesitant in the face of a Houthi threat reinforced by recurring threats from Iran itself and from Tehran’s lesser proxy groups throughout the Middle East.
The Houthi theory of victory in Yemen is not unlike Putin’s theory of victory in Ukraine. The Houthi movement, which entrenched itself in Sana’a approximately twelve years ago by illegally usurping governmental authority in northwestern Yemen, is intent on pursuing a persistent and seemingly inexorable struggle to subdue the whole of Yemen and weaponize the country as a base from which it would be well positioned to rise to the position of custodian of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal. This, in turn, would allow the group to mobilize Yemen’s resources in order to expand further north, seizing or at least imperiling Mecca. To that end, and as an end in itself, the Houthis aim to hold the region’s waterways and energy-production sites hostage.
These are no trivial objectives, and unfortunately, they are not unrealistic, barring decisive and concerted action from the US, the GCC nations, and possibly Israel, as well as some willing European allies.
Strategic bombing campaigns along the lines of Operation Rough Rider in early 2025 can disrupt, degrade, and partially deter the Houthis, but the war against the group can only be won on the ground.
Back in 2025, the US and the UK bombed northwestern Yemen without assembling a broader Gulf Arab coalition and, worse still, without coordinating with local armed factions aligned with the Yemeni rump state.
One year later, and after more than a thousand air strikes, the Houthis had seized the entire Red Sea coast of Yemen, the island of Perim, located at the center of the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, as well as the port city of Mocha.
Operation Rough Rider was emblematic of the Trump administration’s narrow focus on military tactics and strike tallies at the expense of grand strategy, reminiscent of Robert McNamara’s failed approach to the war in Vietnam six decades ago.
Instead of unilateral action relying exclusively on air power, the US will have to craft a strategy that combines American naval, air, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), logistical, and special-forces capabilities with a robust array of regional allies. In particular, Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian forces could support local pro-government militias in a campaign aimed at retaking territory through offensive operations and maneuver warfare.
Rather than limiting the campaign to strategic bombing of targets in Sana’a or Saada, in the Houthi-controlled heartland of northwestern Yemen, the US Air Force would instead have to provide close tactical air support for ongoing and fluid ground operations. These operations would entail targeting frontline positions, armed formations, and supply lines reinforcing entrenched Houthi positions in contested areas of the country. Such an air campaign would hold greater promise for creating the military conditions necessary to facilitate rapid movement on the ground.
The UAE, in particular, has demonstrated the military finesse and operational capability to assist in, and even conduct, professional military operations inside Yemen through its expeditionary forces, seizing territory and pushing the Houthis back. After Sana’a, the de jure capital of Yemen, fell in 2014, the Houthis precipitously marched south in an attempt to capture Aden, Yemen’s second-largest city. However, successful UAE-led counterattacks forced the Houthis to retreat northward, thereby liberating Aden and much of southwestern Yemen.
In 2018, a UAE-led offensive was poised to capture the strategically important Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah when an untimely UN diplomatic intervention, coupled with pressure from Western capitals, thwarted the completion of the operation. The intervention ultimately left the Houthis in control of a city that serves as a key node for undermining freedom of navigation in the area and resupplying Houthi forces.
It was yet another strategic setback that must not be repeated. This time, strategic objectives will have to be clearly articulated by members of the anti-Houthi coalition, and combined allied pressure will have to be sustained until Houthi frontline positions break, culminating in a chaotic withdrawal toward the north of the country and the liberation of strategically important stretches of territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, accompanied by additional gains around the two frontline cities of Marib and Taiz.
With sufficient US, Saudi, and Egyptian backing, the UAE could play a central role in reversing recent Houthi battlefield gains and advancing northward from the southwestern fringe of Yemen toward the eventual capture of Hodeidah and its strategically valuable port.
Capturing this major logistical node, exerting pressure on Oman to close cross-country overland smuggling routes, reducing Houthi territorial control, and pairing these measures with a sustained strategic bombing campaign aimed at the Houthi leadership and the entity’s nascent military-industrial complex would alter the balance of power in the southern Arabian Peninsula, constrain Houthi power projection, and mitigate the risk of further Houthi expansion.
In the past, the US has either relied on unilateral air power or assigned less capable and less decisive allies the task of containing, or even rolling back, advances made by the Houthi movement’s armed wing in Yemen. This will have to change. While the Trump administration has not been particularly adept at building coalitions through shrewd and careful diplomacy, the Yemen file cannot be addressed by the US alone, nor can it simply be handed off to allies who are ill-equipped or hesitant in the face of a Houthi threat reinforced by recurring threats from Iran itself and from Tehran’s lesser proxy groups throughout the Middle East.
The Houthi theory of victory in Yemen is not unlike Putin’s theory of victory in Ukraine. The Houthi movement, which entrenched itself in Sana’a approximately twelve years ago by illegally usurping governmental authority in northwestern Yemen, is intent on pursuing a persistent and seemingly inexorable struggle to subdue the whole of Yemen and weaponize the country as a base from which it would be well positioned to rise to the position of custodian of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal. This, in turn, would allow the group to mobilize Yemen’s resources in order to expand further north, seizing or at least imperiling Mecca. To that end, and as an end in itself, the Houthis aim to hold the region’s waterways and energy-production sites hostage.
These are no trivial objectives, and unfortunately, they are not unrealistic, barring decisive and concerted action from the US, the GCC nations, and possibly Israel, as well as some willing European allies.
Strategic bombing campaigns along the lines of Operation Rough Rider in early 2025 can disrupt, degrade, and partially deter the Houthis, but the war against the group can only be won on the ground.
Back in 2025, the US and the UK bombed northwestern Yemen without assembling a broader Gulf Arab coalition and, worse still, without coordinating with local armed factions aligned with the Yemeni rump state.
One year later, and after more than a thousand air strikes, the Houthis had seized the entire Red Sea coast of Yemen, the island of Perim, located at the center of the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, as well as the port city of Mocha.
Operation Rough Rider was emblematic of the Trump administration’s narrow focus on military tactics and strike tallies at the expense of grand strategy, reminiscent of Robert McNamara’s failed approach to the war in Vietnam six decades ago.
Instead of unilateral action relying exclusively on air power, the US will have to craft a strategy that combines American naval, air, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), logistical, and special-forces capabilities with a robust array of regional allies. In particular, Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian forces could support local pro-government militias in a campaign aimed at retaking territory through offensive operations and maneuver warfare.
Rather than limiting the campaign to strategic bombing of targets in Sana’a or Saada, in the Houthi-controlled heartland of northwestern Yemen, the US Air Force would instead have to provide close tactical air support for ongoing and fluid ground operations. These operations would entail targeting frontline positions, armed formations, and supply lines reinforcing entrenched Houthi positions in contested areas of the country. Such an air campaign would hold greater promise for creating the military conditions necessary to facilitate rapid movement on the ground.
The UAE, in particular, has demonstrated the military finesse and operational capability to assist in, and even conduct, professional military operations inside Yemen through its expeditionary forces, seizing territory and pushing the Houthis back. After Sana’a, the de jure capital of Yemen, fell in 2014, the Houthis precipitously marched south in an attempt to capture Aden, Yemen’s second-largest city. However, successful UAE-led counterattacks forced the Houthis to retreat northward, thereby liberating Aden and much of southwestern Yemen.
In 2018, a UAE-led offensive was poised to capture the strategically important Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah when an untimely UN diplomatic intervention, coupled with pressure from Western capitals, thwarted the completion of the operation. The intervention ultimately left the Houthis in control of a city that serves as a key node for undermining freedom of navigation in the area and resupplying Houthi forces.
It was yet another strategic setback that must not be repeated. This time, strategic objectives will have to be clearly articulated by members of the anti-Houthi coalition, and combined allied pressure will have to be sustained until Houthi frontline positions break, culminating in a chaotic withdrawal toward the north of the country and the liberation of strategically important stretches of territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, accompanied by additional gains around the two frontline cities of Marib and Taiz.
With sufficient US, Saudi, and Egyptian backing, the UAE could play a central role in reversing recent Houthi battlefield gains and advancing northward from the southwestern fringe of Yemen toward the eventual capture of Hodeidah and its strategically valuable port.
Capturing this major logistical node, exerting pressure on Oman to close cross-country overland smuggling routes, reducing Houthi territorial control, and pairing these measures with a sustained strategic bombing campaign aimed at the Houthi leadership and the entity’s nascent military-industrial complex would alter the balance of power in the southern Arabian Peninsula, constrain Houthi power projection, and mitigate the risk of further Houthi expansion.
