A Fallacious Ceasefire
This most recent diplomatic stunt will undoubtedly go down in history as a farce. The President vowed to escalate an ongoing campaign to force the remaining Iranian leadership into submission, instead of yet another extension of the deadline for the aforementioned escalation, President Trump chose to cease offensive operations so as to negotiate on the basis of nothing and in exchange for precious little.
Tehran‘s and Washington‘s positions are jarringly dissonant and understandably so. This regime cannot accept adequate terms which is precisely why the joint US-Israeli campaign was necessary and overdue in the first place since dislodging the Iranian power elite and facilitating a structural transition inside Iran has always been the sole plausible and assured path to address the panoply of threats that emanate from Iran.
Whatever happens, both sides will soon realize that they cannot find common ground and, hopefully, this impromptu truce will not be extended.
Some have called the ongoing ceasefire negotiations in Islamabad “premature”. They are not. Ceasefire negotiations are not an appropriate mechanism to end this war at all. Not now and not in a month from now. Any negotiations automatically empower Iran’s ruling clique which directly contradicts the overriding objective of neutralizing the Islamic Republic of Iran as a menace to the region and the world.
Iran‘s “strongmen” are habitually overconfident, arrogant and delusional. Their persistent tendency has been to overplay their hand even when they may actually be able to secure a diplomatic success at the expense of their enemies, thanks to the recurring pusillanimity of various US administrations.
In any case, the President promised to increase the cadence and intensity of strikes unless Iran‘s regime were to voluntarily re-open the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Therefore, one might assume that any ceasefire negotiations would’ve only been conducted on the condition of an immediate Iranian commitment to halt all interference with maritime shipping in the Gulf a priori to any talks. Evidently, that has not been the case. Iran‘s acute threats to shipping persist.
The military campaign must be resumed expeditiously to destroy and suppress the remaining stockpile of Iranian projectiles and missile launchers, to further debilitate Iran‘s already damaged defense industrial base, to compound the political destabilization through additional decapitation strikes aimed at Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the new-old entourage that seems to have coalesced around him. Moreover, the assault on military targets has to be accompanied by escalating strikes on internal security personnel, equipment and infrastructure. As the most pressing and urgent objective, a resumed campaign needs to finally re-open the Persian Gulf by force, in part by seizing the Iranian islands that abut the Strait of Hormuz and by initiating escort operations to facilitate the passage of crude and LNG convoys to render the largely theoretical Iranian veto over the freedom of navigation in the Gulf obsolete - and to reassert US naval supremacy.
Once the core military missions are concluded, a unilateral US-Israeli declaration promulgating a de facto truce and a concurrent cessation of hostilities may end military operations until they will need to be resumed to assist an Iranian revolution in due time. In the meantime, there is no need to negotiate with Iran on any substantive issues. Instead, the internal contradictions in Iran will need to be amplified with US-Israeli aid even after the military campaign ends. This will encompass financial aid to dissidents, efforts to organize crippling nationwide strikes and protests, the transfer of weapons and communications devices, intelligence efforts to co-opt and recruit a growing number of regime insiders and security forces to gradually chip away at the regime‘s power and cohesion and to eventually turn their own guns against them. To deny the regime the funds to rebuild and reconstitute its forces, no amount of sanctions relief is permissible, instead, once the Strait has been forcibly re-opened, a quarantine of all Iranian-affiliated vessels must be instituted forthwith to throttle Iranian energy exports and vital gasoline imports completely.
In time, the regime will crumble and the Iranian people will rise up and should be able to count on comprehensive US-Israeli assistance when the time comes. When it does, Iran‘s asymmetrical, yet conventional, threat matrix will have been significantly diminished, thus lowering the risk of an intervention on behalf of the Iranian people.
Tehran‘s and Washington‘s positions are jarringly dissonant and understandably so. This regime cannot accept adequate terms which is precisely why the joint US-Israeli campaign was necessary and overdue in the first place since dislodging the Iranian power elite and facilitating a structural transition inside Iran has always been the sole plausible and assured path to address the panoply of threats that emanate from Iran.
Whatever happens, both sides will soon realize that they cannot find common ground and, hopefully, this impromptu truce will not be extended.
Some have called the ongoing ceasefire negotiations in Islamabad “premature”. They are not. Ceasefire negotiations are not an appropriate mechanism to end this war at all. Not now and not in a month from now. Any negotiations automatically empower Iran’s ruling clique which directly contradicts the overriding objective of neutralizing the Islamic Republic of Iran as a menace to the region and the world.
Iran‘s “strongmen” are habitually overconfident, arrogant and delusional. Their persistent tendency has been to overplay their hand even when they may actually be able to secure a diplomatic success at the expense of their enemies, thanks to the recurring pusillanimity of various US administrations.
In any case, the President promised to increase the cadence and intensity of strikes unless Iran‘s regime were to voluntarily re-open the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Therefore, one might assume that any ceasefire negotiations would’ve only been conducted on the condition of an immediate Iranian commitment to halt all interference with maritime shipping in the Gulf a priori to any talks. Evidently, that has not been the case. Iran‘s acute threats to shipping persist.
The military campaign must be resumed expeditiously to destroy and suppress the remaining stockpile of Iranian projectiles and missile launchers, to further debilitate Iran‘s already damaged defense industrial base, to compound the political destabilization through additional decapitation strikes aimed at Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the new-old entourage that seems to have coalesced around him. Moreover, the assault on military targets has to be accompanied by escalating strikes on internal security personnel, equipment and infrastructure. As the most pressing and urgent objective, a resumed campaign needs to finally re-open the Persian Gulf by force, in part by seizing the Iranian islands that abut the Strait of Hormuz and by initiating escort operations to facilitate the passage of crude and LNG convoys to render the largely theoretical Iranian veto over the freedom of navigation in the Gulf obsolete - and to reassert US naval supremacy.
Once the core military missions are concluded, a unilateral US-Israeli declaration promulgating a de facto truce and a concurrent cessation of hostilities may end military operations until they will need to be resumed to assist an Iranian revolution in due time. In the meantime, there is no need to negotiate with Iran on any substantive issues. Instead, the internal contradictions in Iran will need to be amplified with US-Israeli aid even after the military campaign ends. This will encompass financial aid to dissidents, efforts to organize crippling nationwide strikes and protests, the transfer of weapons and communications devices, intelligence efforts to co-opt and recruit a growing number of regime insiders and security forces to gradually chip away at the regime‘s power and cohesion and to eventually turn their own guns against them. To deny the regime the funds to rebuild and reconstitute its forces, no amount of sanctions relief is permissible, instead, once the Strait has been forcibly re-opened, a quarantine of all Iranian-affiliated vessels must be instituted forthwith to throttle Iranian energy exports and vital gasoline imports completely.
In time, the regime will crumble and the Iranian people will rise up and should be able to count on comprehensive US-Israeli assistance when the time comes. When it does, Iran‘s asymmetrical, yet conventional, threat matrix will have been significantly diminished, thus lowering the risk of an intervention on behalf of the Iranian people.
