The Mechanics behind Regime Change in Iran
Wars are usually covered by a thick layer of fog—the proverbial fog of war. The objectives of a war, however, are usually less obscure, or at least they should be.
The United States is a democracy, and if even seasoned analysts and foreign policy
professionals can only speculate about the strategic objectives of the combined U.S.–Israeli campaign, then most American citizens are likewise forced to speculate about the goals of one of the most ambitious U.S. military endeavors in the Middle East yet.
As a proponent of regime change and democracy promotion in Iran, I will outline what I believe to be the administration’s thinking and the motives behind the strategic ambiguity surrounding the issue of regime change. Moreover, I will describe the practical mechanics that could bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The U.S. administration—and the president himself—ultimately aims for the toppling, or at least the radical transformation, of the regime. This is the White House’s preferred political outcome of the ongoing campaign. If the goal were merely to diminish Iran’s power-projection capabilities, as some administration officials have suggested on multiple occasions, there would be no need to target both the political leadership of Iran and its internal security apparatus.
The president has also reiterated at various times that he expects the Iranian people eventually to rise up. He likewise anticipates influencing the selection of an interim leader and successor to the Khamenei dynasty.
Regime change without boots on the ground depends on multiple groups within Iranian society. It will rely not only on the Iranian public at large but also on dispirited and fatigued regime insiders and members of the security forces. Without the confluence of mass protests and large-scale defections or desertions, domestic pressure will not be sufficient to structurally alter Iran’s political system.
As I have argued elsewhere, this campaign was never designed to guarantee regime change—only to create the most favorable conditions for it. For that to happen, the old order does not have to collapse all at once or even during the current phase of bombardment. But it does need to fracture, at least beneath the surface.
The ultimate success of this campaign remains an open question, particularly while the Iranian people still find themselves in the midst of an ongoing war.
If the U.S. administration had hoped for a smoother and more expeditious transition to a pliant figure—akin to the much-invoked Venezuela model—those expectations were effectively frustrated by the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as his father’s successor.
Iran is not Venezuela, and the search for accommodating pragmatists among the current ruling clique is largely futile and academic. Leading members of the regime—including Ali Larijani, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Abbas Araghchi, and Mojtaba Khamenei—need to be removed either politically or, if necessary, by force.
Given this predicament, the distinction between regime change and regime modification becomes negligible, since both require the complete removal of the Islamic Republic’s top political echelon. The only realistic way to ensure the eventual implosion of the revolutionary order in Iran lies with defectors and dissatisfied elements within the security apparatus—particularly reputable and influential mid-ranking officers and commanders capable of enabling and sustaining a concerted effort to dislodge the current order, backed by the IRGC and the Basij paramilitaries, from power.
Leaderless, unarmed, and disorganized protesters may grow in number and even retake the streets and squares of Iran once the United States and Israel transition to a lighter, drone-centric phase of the military campaign. This phase would involve micro-targeting stationary and mobile security forces before and during a renewed wave of mass protests.
This would represent new operational terrain for both the Israeli Air Force and the U.S. Air Force. Slower, low-flying drones could be used not only to target repressive units but also to bolster public morale in the face of repression, while deterring—or physically preventing—police units, paramilitaries, and Revolutionary Guard forces from committing further massacres.
Through cyber operations, tactical communication among the various repressive units and their commanders could be disrupted across the country. Cyber tools could also be deployed to erase intelligence data collected on opposition figures and to dismantle elements of the regime’s digital surveillance infrastructure. Crucially, the regime’s internet blackout would have to be lifted through cyber operations and through the smuggling of secure and accessible communication tools to Iranians willing to mobilize once again.
However, even if such an untested and risky strategy were to succeed, seizing control of a government without cohesive armed units, trained bureaucrats, or a clear leadership structure—and holding that control despite the presence of armed, organized, and still-active pro-regime forces—would remain implausible without the support of military units willing to align with and protect the opposition and the Iranian people.
Psychological operations, paired with clandestine outreach to defectors and potential coup plotters, would therefore be an indispensable element of any effective regime-change strategy.
Over time, Iran’s retaliatory capabilities can and will be gradually degraded and ultimately neutralized. As this process unfolds, cracks may appear among officers, foot soldiers, and even members of the Revolutionary Guard. There are already indications of de facto desertions, as law-enforcement and military personnel increasingly abandon their posts or go into hiding in heavily bombed areas of the country.
Once the regime’s retaliatory options are exhausted and the Persian Gulf reopened, Iranian airspace would remain accessible to the combined U.S.–Israeli force. At that stage, the heavy bombing campaign could give way to more precise military strikes designed to encourage and support a revolutionary uprising.
We are not there yet. But the conditions for such a development may be methodically taking shape during the ongoing campaign.
The United States is a democracy, and if even seasoned analysts and foreign policy
professionals can only speculate about the strategic objectives of the combined U.S.–Israeli campaign, then most American citizens are likewise forced to speculate about the goals of one of the most ambitious U.S. military endeavors in the Middle East yet.
As a proponent of regime change and democracy promotion in Iran, I will outline what I believe to be the administration’s thinking and the motives behind the strategic ambiguity surrounding the issue of regime change. Moreover, I will describe the practical mechanics that could bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The U.S. administration—and the president himself—ultimately aims for the toppling, or at least the radical transformation, of the regime. This is the White House’s preferred political outcome of the ongoing campaign. If the goal were merely to diminish Iran’s power-projection capabilities, as some administration officials have suggested on multiple occasions, there would be no need to target both the political leadership of Iran and its internal security apparatus.
The president has also reiterated at various times that he expects the Iranian people eventually to rise up. He likewise anticipates influencing the selection of an interim leader and successor to the Khamenei dynasty.
Regime change without boots on the ground depends on multiple groups within Iranian society. It will rely not only on the Iranian public at large but also on dispirited and fatigued regime insiders and members of the security forces. Without the confluence of mass protests and large-scale defections or desertions, domestic pressure will not be sufficient to structurally alter Iran’s political system.
As I have argued elsewhere, this campaign was never designed to guarantee regime change—only to create the most favorable conditions for it. For that to happen, the old order does not have to collapse all at once or even during the current phase of bombardment. But it does need to fracture, at least beneath the surface.
The ultimate success of this campaign remains an open question, particularly while the Iranian people still find themselves in the midst of an ongoing war.
If the U.S. administration had hoped for a smoother and more expeditious transition to a pliant figure—akin to the much-invoked Venezuela model—those expectations were effectively frustrated by the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as his father’s successor.
Iran is not Venezuela, and the search for accommodating pragmatists among the current ruling clique is largely futile and academic. Leading members of the regime—including Ali Larijani, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Abbas Araghchi, and Mojtaba Khamenei—need to be removed either politically or, if necessary, by force.
Given this predicament, the distinction between regime change and regime modification becomes negligible, since both require the complete removal of the Islamic Republic’s top political echelon. The only realistic way to ensure the eventual implosion of the revolutionary order in Iran lies with defectors and dissatisfied elements within the security apparatus—particularly reputable and influential mid-ranking officers and commanders capable of enabling and sustaining a concerted effort to dislodge the current order, backed by the IRGC and the Basij paramilitaries, from power.
Leaderless, unarmed, and disorganized protesters may grow in number and even retake the streets and squares of Iran once the United States and Israel transition to a lighter, drone-centric phase of the military campaign. This phase would involve micro-targeting stationary and mobile security forces before and during a renewed wave of mass protests.
This would represent new operational terrain for both the Israeli Air Force and the U.S. Air Force. Slower, low-flying drones could be used not only to target repressive units but also to bolster public morale in the face of repression, while deterring—or physically preventing—police units, paramilitaries, and Revolutionary Guard forces from committing further massacres.
Through cyber operations, tactical communication among the various repressive units and their commanders could be disrupted across the country. Cyber tools could also be deployed to erase intelligence data collected on opposition figures and to dismantle elements of the regime’s digital surveillance infrastructure. Crucially, the regime’s internet blackout would have to be lifted through cyber operations and through the smuggling of secure and accessible communication tools to Iranians willing to mobilize once again.
However, even if such an untested and risky strategy were to succeed, seizing control of a government without cohesive armed units, trained bureaucrats, or a clear leadership structure—and holding that control despite the presence of armed, organized, and still-active pro-regime forces—would remain implausible without the support of military units willing to align with and protect the opposition and the Iranian people.
Psychological operations, paired with clandestine outreach to defectors and potential coup plotters, would therefore be an indispensable element of any effective regime-change strategy.
Over time, Iran’s retaliatory capabilities can and will be gradually degraded and ultimately neutralized. As this process unfolds, cracks may appear among officers, foot soldiers, and even members of the Revolutionary Guard. There are already indications of de facto desertions, as law-enforcement and military personnel increasingly abandon their posts or go into hiding in heavily bombed areas of the country.
Once the regime’s retaliatory options are exhausted and the Persian Gulf reopened, Iranian airspace would remain accessible to the combined U.S.–Israeli force. At that stage, the heavy bombing campaign could give way to more precise military strikes designed to encourage and support a revolutionary uprising.
We are not there yet. But the conditions for such a development may be methodically taking shape during the ongoing campaign.
