The Iran War and the Persian Gulf

Tehran‘s threat to the Middle East and to the world economy has been unmasked by its conduct during the ongoing Iran war. For those who‘ve followed Iran‘s behavioral patterns, it hardly comes as a surprise that the theocratic regime made the deliberate choice of elevating itself to the world‘s preeminent threat to the freedom of navigation and to the free flow of energy. In 1987/1988, amidst the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian navy mined the Persian Gulf until the United States decisively intervened and halved the total number of its surface vessels while destroying a series of naval command posts during Operation Praying Mantis. The Iranians ceased their hostilities at the time and agreed to a maritime ceasefire in response to the overwhelming display of power by the United States. Back then, however, Iran‘s political system was not at risk of being toppled by the United States.

In 2019, Iran fired missiles at some of the world‘s largest oil refineries in Abqaiq and Khurais, Saudi Arabia. Also beginning in 2019, Iran increased its interference with commercial maritime operations in the Gulf by using fast attack craft, sea mines and drones. The UAE was Iran‘s primary target during that period of upheaval. Moreover, Iran‘s IRGC-Quds Forces supplied the Houthis in Yemen with copious amounts of various projectiles needed to disrupt Red Sea shipping, which the Houthis, with Iran‘s explicit blessing and intelligence support, put to use amidst the height of the Gaza war.

There is no sustainable way to degrade Iran‘s or the Houthi‘s ability to hold crucial regional waterways hostage, in particular the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. The systems that are being employed by both the Iranians and the Houthis are cheap, they can be regenerated, domestically produced and are far ahead of anything available to littoral rogue states such as Libya or Iraq two decades ago.

A mere degradation of their capabilities is, therefore, no strategic panacea. Degradation is a purely tactical step that has to be taken to pave the way for the deployment of naval assets in order to escort oil tankers as long as the war against Iran continues.
However, the decimation of Iranian minelayers, sea mine stockpiles, or myriad anti-ship projectiles would not secure the Middle East‘s waterways or its crucial energy production indefinitely, only as long as it would take for Tehran to restock its arsenals. No degradation campaign can turn Iran into a landlocked state or vaporize its rugged coastline which is marked by numerous coves that offer protection to small speed boats and land-based anti-ship systems.

This war has laid bare an uncomfortable truth that was ignored for too long. So long as the Iranian regime remains in power, it can hold the region‘s maritime chokepoints hostage. Not because of Iran‘s completely absent naval supremacy but because of the evolving nature of asymmetric threats to shipping and the habitual risk aversion of both shipping companies and maritime insurers.

If the United States, Israel and the affected Gulf nations want to create a Middle East, free of hostile powers that are both willing to and capable of disrupting commercial shipping and energy flows, then this war mustn’t end before the military-clerical state in Iran collapses and is succeeded by a cooperative and peaceful government. Any attempt to temporarily unclog the Strait of Hormuz should therefore just be seen as a tactically expedient sub-campaign in the context of the overarching military campaign aimed at overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran.