A 2026 Program for U.S. Middle Eastern Policy
When Hamas fighters swept into southern Israel on October 7, 2023—raiding and terrorizing nearby kibbutzim—it presented the United States and its regional partners with a stark opportunity to change course. For years, U.S. policy had been defined by retrenchment: a posture marked by passivity and a pronounced reluctance to actively shape geopolitical outcomes in the Middle East.
At the time, I argued for a comprehensive recalibration of U.S. Middle Eastern policy—one aimed at reasserting uncontested American regional hegemony. This would require abandoning a timid and reactive stance toward U.S. adversaries in favor of an offensive campaign designed to eliminate Hamas, Hezbollah, the Assad regime, Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis, and ultimately to confront the Iranian regime itself. It was a tall order—one that, just days before October 7, would have seemed inconceivable to most experts, diplomats, and politicians. Yet here we are.
Despite the remarkable progress of recent years, much work remains.
The strategic environment for finishing off weakened adversaries could hardly be more favorable. But success must not breed complacency in either Washington or Jerusalem. Significant challenges still lie ahead.
This essay focuses on the Levant. A second installment will outline a broader U.S. policy agenda for the Middle East beyond the Levant.
Gaza
In Gaza, Hamas was severely degraded during the initial phase of Israel’s invasion, which concluded last October with a tenuous ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire, however, was not a strategic breakthrough so much as a tactical one. It secured the return of the remaining hostages and the bodies of the deceased to Israel, while roughly half of Gaza—including the critical Rafah corridor—remains under Israeli military control.
By removing the hostage issue from the battlefield, the ceasefire stripped Hamas of its most potent leverage. The organization can no longer exploit hostages as bargaining chips or human shields.
The IDF now occupies an advantageous position from which to prepare a second phase of operations targeting Hamas-controlled areas beyond the provisional demarcation line that currently bisects the enclave. The Israeli-controlled zone can serve as a staging ground for renewed offensive action while also functioning as a protected humanitarian area for civilians gradually evacuated from densely populated districts.
Such an approach would allow Israel to separate combatants from noncombatants more effectively, while facilitating the steady delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians relocated to Israeli-controlled territory.
Simultaneously, Israel should prioritize training and equipping vetted Gazan local forces capable of assisting IDF operations in Gaza City, the central refugee camps, and Khan Younis. Sustained counterinsurgency operations will be required to dismantle Hamas’s remaining military infrastructure, deplete its stockpiles, and neutralize its fighters—unless the organization’s leadership agrees to disarm, demobilize, and leave Gaza.
For this strategy to succeed, Israel will require robust U.S. support. It is likely that major hostilities will resume in the coming months, with prior U.S. approval.
Only after Hamas-controlled areas are fully cleared and secured can a combination of local security forces, private contractors, and potentially an international stabilization force step in to consolidate a hard-fought peace. That stabilization phase is a prerequisite for meaningful reconstruction and for the safe return of internally displaced civilians.
Lebanon
Over the past several years, the IDF briefly invaded southern Lebanon, established air superiority across Lebanese airspace, positioned forward operating bases south of the Litani River, neutralized Hezbollah’s senior leadership, and significantly degraded its forces through intelligence operations, raids, and sustained airstrikes.
Yet Hezbollah remains intact. It has been weakened, but not eliminated.
Israel may ultimately conclude that a second ground invasion is necessary to further degrade Hezbollah to the point where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the government in Beirut no longer fear the consequences of launching a sustained national campaign against the group.
A renewed Israeli offensive could serve two purposes. Operationally, it would weaken Hezbollah’s residual military cells, making them more vulnerable to Lebanese state action. Politically, it would increase pressure on Beirut to act decisively in order to curtail the duration of an unwanted and delicate Israeli military presence.
To facilitate the eventual “Lebanization” of the conflict, Israel should maintain its military posture in southern Lebanon, conduct raids against Hezbollah targets as necessary, and continue calibrated airstrikes to prevent reconstitution of the group’s capabilities.
Although Israel would lead such operations, U.S. backing would remain essential—both to legitimize the effort and to translate battlefield gains into lasting political outcomes.
Even if Hezbollah is defeated militarily, it will persist as a political force. The United States and Israel should leverage Hezbollah’s military defeat to press for sweeping domestic reforms that bar the organization from formal political participation. If Hezbollah retains access to public funds and state institutions, it will inevitably regenerate its military apparatus.
Sanctions, coercive diplomacy, conditional aid, and continued Israeli military pressure can be used to erode Hezbollah’s political influence—particularly once the organization is no longer capable of credibly threatening civil war should the Lebanese state attempt to marginalize it.
Syria
On the surface, Syria appears to be moving in a more favorable direction. After years of U.S. pressure and sustained Israeli action against Hezbollah, pro-Iranian militias, and Iranian assets, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmad al-Shaara, marched from their enclave around Idlib and, with the help of various anti-Assad militias, seized Damascus. The Assad dynasty has fallen, bringing an end to one of the darkest chapters in Syria’s modern history.
Yet U.S. policy risks squandering this historic opportunity.
The current approach appears to rest on the assumption that al-Shaara and his government can become reliable partners—and that he can be entrusted with centralized authority over the Syrian state while prosecuting the anti-ISIS mission. Such assumptions are risky. An overly accommodating posture would amount to forfeiting significant U.S. leverage over Syria’s future trajectory.
Instead, Washington should recalibrate its Syria policy around a principle of “trust, but verify.” U.S. leverage must be preserved and, if necessary, activated to prevent backsliding.
To that end, the United States should retain a limited military footprint in Syria to safeguard Kurdish interests and counter ISIS or Iranian smuggling networks should Damascus prove unwilling or unable to meet its commitments.
Neither Russia nor Turkey has withdrawn its forces from Syria, nor signaled any intention to do so. Meanwhile, the United States risks unilaterally diminishing its own leverage by reducing its presence and transferring strategic bases—such as al-Tanf—to Syrian government control.
Sanctions relief and reconstruction assistance should be conditioned on tangible progress toward a representative, inclusive constitutional framework and credible elections. Any Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory should be tied to a normalization agreement, enforceable protections for minority communities such as the Druze, and a bilateral security arrangement—including continued Israeli access to Syrian airspace as part of a broader regional security architecture.
Finally, Washington should encourage decentralization within Syria to secure meaningful Kurdish autonomy and empower minority communities as institutional counterweights within a federal system. Rather than granting carte blanche to a new leadership with jihadist roots, the United States should pursue a hedging strategy: giving Syria space to succeed while maintaining safeguards against foreseeable contingencies
At the time, I argued for a comprehensive recalibration of U.S. Middle Eastern policy—one aimed at reasserting uncontested American regional hegemony. This would require abandoning a timid and reactive stance toward U.S. adversaries in favor of an offensive campaign designed to eliminate Hamas, Hezbollah, the Assad regime, Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis, and ultimately to confront the Iranian regime itself. It was a tall order—one that, just days before October 7, would have seemed inconceivable to most experts, diplomats, and politicians. Yet here we are.
Despite the remarkable progress of recent years, much work remains.
The strategic environment for finishing off weakened adversaries could hardly be more favorable. But success must not breed complacency in either Washington or Jerusalem. Significant challenges still lie ahead.
This essay focuses on the Levant. A second installment will outline a broader U.S. policy agenda for the Middle East beyond the Levant.
Gaza
In Gaza, Hamas was severely degraded during the initial phase of Israel’s invasion, which concluded last October with a tenuous ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire, however, was not a strategic breakthrough so much as a tactical one. It secured the return of the remaining hostages and the bodies of the deceased to Israel, while roughly half of Gaza—including the critical Rafah corridor—remains under Israeli military control.
By removing the hostage issue from the battlefield, the ceasefire stripped Hamas of its most potent leverage. The organization can no longer exploit hostages as bargaining chips or human shields.
The IDF now occupies an advantageous position from which to prepare a second phase of operations targeting Hamas-controlled areas beyond the provisional demarcation line that currently bisects the enclave. The Israeli-controlled zone can serve as a staging ground for renewed offensive action while also functioning as a protected humanitarian area for civilians gradually evacuated from densely populated districts.
Such an approach would allow Israel to separate combatants from noncombatants more effectively, while facilitating the steady delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians relocated to Israeli-controlled territory.
Simultaneously, Israel should prioritize training and equipping vetted Gazan local forces capable of assisting IDF operations in Gaza City, the central refugee camps, and Khan Younis. Sustained counterinsurgency operations will be required to dismantle Hamas’s remaining military infrastructure, deplete its stockpiles, and neutralize its fighters—unless the organization’s leadership agrees to disarm, demobilize, and leave Gaza.
For this strategy to succeed, Israel will require robust U.S. support. It is likely that major hostilities will resume in the coming months, with prior U.S. approval.
Only after Hamas-controlled areas are fully cleared and secured can a combination of local security forces, private contractors, and potentially an international stabilization force step in to consolidate a hard-fought peace. That stabilization phase is a prerequisite for meaningful reconstruction and for the safe return of internally displaced civilians.
Lebanon
Over the past several years, the IDF briefly invaded southern Lebanon, established air superiority across Lebanese airspace, positioned forward operating bases south of the Litani River, neutralized Hezbollah’s senior leadership, and significantly degraded its forces through intelligence operations, raids, and sustained airstrikes.
Yet Hezbollah remains intact. It has been weakened, but not eliminated.
Israel may ultimately conclude that a second ground invasion is necessary to further degrade Hezbollah to the point where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the government in Beirut no longer fear the consequences of launching a sustained national campaign against the group.
A renewed Israeli offensive could serve two purposes. Operationally, it would weaken Hezbollah’s residual military cells, making them more vulnerable to Lebanese state action. Politically, it would increase pressure on Beirut to act decisively in order to curtail the duration of an unwanted and delicate Israeli military presence.
To facilitate the eventual “Lebanization” of the conflict, Israel should maintain its military posture in southern Lebanon, conduct raids against Hezbollah targets as necessary, and continue calibrated airstrikes to prevent reconstitution of the group’s capabilities.
Although Israel would lead such operations, U.S. backing would remain essential—both to legitimize the effort and to translate battlefield gains into lasting political outcomes.
Even if Hezbollah is defeated militarily, it will persist as a political force. The United States and Israel should leverage Hezbollah’s military defeat to press for sweeping domestic reforms that bar the organization from formal political participation. If Hezbollah retains access to public funds and state institutions, it will inevitably regenerate its military apparatus.
Sanctions, coercive diplomacy, conditional aid, and continued Israeli military pressure can be used to erode Hezbollah’s political influence—particularly once the organization is no longer capable of credibly threatening civil war should the Lebanese state attempt to marginalize it.
Syria
On the surface, Syria appears to be moving in a more favorable direction. After years of U.S. pressure and sustained Israeli action against Hezbollah, pro-Iranian militias, and Iranian assets, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmad al-Shaara, marched from their enclave around Idlib and, with the help of various anti-Assad militias, seized Damascus. The Assad dynasty has fallen, bringing an end to one of the darkest chapters in Syria’s modern history.
Yet U.S. policy risks squandering this historic opportunity.
The current approach appears to rest on the assumption that al-Shaara and his government can become reliable partners—and that he can be entrusted with centralized authority over the Syrian state while prosecuting the anti-ISIS mission. Such assumptions are risky. An overly accommodating posture would amount to forfeiting significant U.S. leverage over Syria’s future trajectory.
Instead, Washington should recalibrate its Syria policy around a principle of “trust, but verify.” U.S. leverage must be preserved and, if necessary, activated to prevent backsliding.
To that end, the United States should retain a limited military footprint in Syria to safeguard Kurdish interests and counter ISIS or Iranian smuggling networks should Damascus prove unwilling or unable to meet its commitments.
Neither Russia nor Turkey has withdrawn its forces from Syria, nor signaled any intention to do so. Meanwhile, the United States risks unilaterally diminishing its own leverage by reducing its presence and transferring strategic bases—such as al-Tanf—to Syrian government control.
Sanctions relief and reconstruction assistance should be conditioned on tangible progress toward a representative, inclusive constitutional framework and credible elections. Any Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory should be tied to a normalization agreement, enforceable protections for minority communities such as the Druze, and a bilateral security arrangement—including continued Israeli access to Syrian airspace as part of a broader regional security architecture.
Finally, Washington should encourage decentralization within Syria to secure meaningful Kurdish autonomy and empower minority communities as institutional counterweights within a federal system. Rather than granting carte blanche to a new leadership with jihadist roots, the United States should pursue a hedging strategy: giving Syria space to succeed while maintaining safeguards against foreseeable contingencies
22-25, M
