Trump Betrays the Kurds and U.S. Interests in Syria
The fall of Assad in 2024 remains one of the most positive developments in the modern history of the Middle East. At this point, however, it is clear that U.S. policy toward post-Assad Syria amounts to a combination of strategic malpractice and moral failure.
In 2024, the United States held all the cards. Militias loyal to Syria’s new ruler, Ahmad al-Sharaa, were fragmented. Israel had seized a series of critical positions along the Israeli-Syrian border and destroyed much of the former regime’s heavy-weapons stockpiles—arms that might otherwise have fallen into the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its affiliates. Syria’s economy remained heavily sanctioned, as did HTS itself. Meanwhile, the U.S. maintained a limited military presence in northeastern Syria and continued its cooperation with the pro-American Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led militia that contributed more than any other Syrian armed group to the territorial defeat of ISIS.
At the time, there should have been no illusions about what an HTS takeover entailed. This was not the ascendance of a liberal or secular movement. While HTS and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, had moderated their behavior and abandoned overt jihadism in favor of a more Machiavellian approach to governance, the group’s record remained deeply troubling. In Idlib—where HTS ruled during the civil war—al-Sharaa governed as an autocrat, exercising power in a thoroughly authoritarian manner. Crucially, he did so without having to contend with large ethnic or sectarian minorities seeking political autonomy or independent security forces to protect themselves from abuse and persecution. Now that HTS controls most of Syria, that reality has fundamentally changed.
When caution should have guided U.S. policy, the Trump administration instead embraced the new regime with remarkably few reservations or conditions. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack became less a representative of American interests than an advocate for Turkish and HTS priorities in Syria.
The new Syrian regime was granted carte blanche even before it demonstrated the ability to contain ISIS, purge Salafi-jihadist elements from its ranks, or commit to an inclusive and representative political process capable of bridging Syria’s deep ethnic, sectarian, and regional divides. Yet the U.S. administration rushed to confer legitimacy on the regime, lifted sanctions by executive decree, and urged Congress to follow suit through sweeping sanctions waivers. At the same time, Washington continued to push for an ill-advised security compact between Israel and Syria—one that would reduce Israel’s ability to restrain al-Sharaa’s worst impulses through the credible threat of force.
A more responsible approach would have been gradual, conditional, and outcome-oriented. The United States was well positioned to impose stringent demands and extract meaningful concessions. One of the most obvious requirements should have been the complete denial of basing rights to the Russian military. Such a demand was never made, despite the fact that it could have produced one of the most consequential geopolitical dividends of Assad’s fall. Instead, Syria’s new rulers cultivated ties with Moscow and allowed a reduced Russian military presence to persist in Latakia and Tartus.
Compounding these errors, the Trump administration repeatedly gave al-Sharaa the benefit of the doubt even as evidence mounted that skeptics were correct. Violent repression of the Alawite minority, armed clashes with Druze communities, a sham election, and the presence of individuals within the new Syrian security services who had killed U.S. military personnel all failed to trigger a serious reassessment of Washington’s Syria policy.
Most egregiously, the administration appears to have greenlighted an offensive by the new Syrian Army against Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Syria. When Damascus attempted to exploit ethnic tensions to seize Sweida Province—a predominantly Druze region—Israel intervened, successfully protecting a community that had never fought alongside or on behalf of Israel. In contrast, when it came to the SDF, the United States stood aside as al-Sharaa once again chose a military solution over negotiation, refusing to concede any meaningful limits on his political power.
If al-Sharaa’s ambition to create a highly centralized state under his personal control outweighs his willingness to avoid war with his own citizens, then he represents a clear danger to Syria’s future and to regional stability more broadly—particularly if left unchecked.
It is time to push back against the new Syrian regime. Syrian army units should be compelled—through the credible use of U.S. airpower—to withdraw west of the Euphrates River. Sanctions must be reinstated by both the administration and Congress. The remaining Russian bases must be closed. Finally, a genuine process of federalization and a credible transition to democratic governance must be initiated.
In 2024, the United States held all the cards. Militias loyal to Syria’s new ruler, Ahmad al-Sharaa, were fragmented. Israel had seized a series of critical positions along the Israeli-Syrian border and destroyed much of the former regime’s heavy-weapons stockpiles—arms that might otherwise have fallen into the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its affiliates. Syria’s economy remained heavily sanctioned, as did HTS itself. Meanwhile, the U.S. maintained a limited military presence in northeastern Syria and continued its cooperation with the pro-American Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led militia that contributed more than any other Syrian armed group to the territorial defeat of ISIS.
At the time, there should have been no illusions about what an HTS takeover entailed. This was not the ascendance of a liberal or secular movement. While HTS and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, had moderated their behavior and abandoned overt jihadism in favor of a more Machiavellian approach to governance, the group’s record remained deeply troubling. In Idlib—where HTS ruled during the civil war—al-Sharaa governed as an autocrat, exercising power in a thoroughly authoritarian manner. Crucially, he did so without having to contend with large ethnic or sectarian minorities seeking political autonomy or independent security forces to protect themselves from abuse and persecution. Now that HTS controls most of Syria, that reality has fundamentally changed.
When caution should have guided U.S. policy, the Trump administration instead embraced the new regime with remarkably few reservations or conditions. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack became less a representative of American interests than an advocate for Turkish and HTS priorities in Syria.
The new Syrian regime was granted carte blanche even before it demonstrated the ability to contain ISIS, purge Salafi-jihadist elements from its ranks, or commit to an inclusive and representative political process capable of bridging Syria’s deep ethnic, sectarian, and regional divides. Yet the U.S. administration rushed to confer legitimacy on the regime, lifted sanctions by executive decree, and urged Congress to follow suit through sweeping sanctions waivers. At the same time, Washington continued to push for an ill-advised security compact between Israel and Syria—one that would reduce Israel’s ability to restrain al-Sharaa’s worst impulses through the credible threat of force.
A more responsible approach would have been gradual, conditional, and outcome-oriented. The United States was well positioned to impose stringent demands and extract meaningful concessions. One of the most obvious requirements should have been the complete denial of basing rights to the Russian military. Such a demand was never made, despite the fact that it could have produced one of the most consequential geopolitical dividends of Assad’s fall. Instead, Syria’s new rulers cultivated ties with Moscow and allowed a reduced Russian military presence to persist in Latakia and Tartus.
Compounding these errors, the Trump administration repeatedly gave al-Sharaa the benefit of the doubt even as evidence mounted that skeptics were correct. Violent repression of the Alawite minority, armed clashes with Druze communities, a sham election, and the presence of individuals within the new Syrian security services who had killed U.S. military personnel all failed to trigger a serious reassessment of Washington’s Syria policy.
Most egregiously, the administration appears to have greenlighted an offensive by the new Syrian Army against Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Syria. When Damascus attempted to exploit ethnic tensions to seize Sweida Province—a predominantly Druze region—Israel intervened, successfully protecting a community that had never fought alongside or on behalf of Israel. In contrast, when it came to the SDF, the United States stood aside as al-Sharaa once again chose a military solution over negotiation, refusing to concede any meaningful limits on his political power.
If al-Sharaa’s ambition to create a highly centralized state under his personal control outweighs his willingness to avoid war with his own citizens, then he represents a clear danger to Syria’s future and to regional stability more broadly—particularly if left unchecked.
It is time to push back against the new Syrian regime. Syrian army units should be compelled—through the credible use of U.S. airpower—to withdraw west of the Euphrates River. Sanctions must be reinstated by both the administration and Congress. The remaining Russian bases must be closed. Finally, a genuine process of federalization and a credible transition to democratic governance must be initiated.
