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How to turn Iran‘s protests into an era defining event for the Middle East

Last year, Israeli and US operations jointly neutralized Iran‘s nuclear program, diminished the regime‘s ballistic missile capabilities, took out the highest echelons of the country’s military and scientific leadership and removed all air defense obstacles that might’ve impeded that operation or any future military strike in the near term.

At that point, I was arguing for a prolonged series of surgical strikes to not only break the regime‘s military back but to aim for the corrosion of its internal security organs, the IRGC, the morality police, the cyber police and the Basij, a paramilitary militia that specializes in the brutal suppression of protests. This in turn, was supposed to enable large scale protests to remove Ali Khamenei, his sinister retinue of fanatics as well as the theocratic system itself.

While Israel did take advantage of the 12 day war to hit internal security nodes in Tehran, these attacks fell short of any sustained and vigorous attempt to dislodge the Mullah regime from power. The strikes were clearly secondary to the goal of destroying Iran‘s nuclear program but Israel might’ve been willing to exploit that historic window of opportunity to topple the regime had the Trump administration not cut short the 12 day war by announcing a premature cessation of military operations.

Despite the disappointing reticence in the face of a monumental strategic opportunity, I felt reassured by my faith and confidence in the Iranian people who have demonstrated again and again that they’re willing to risk their remaining material possessions, their physical freedom and their own lives and well-being as well as the lives and well-being of their friends and family to challenge the farcical legitimacy of the theocratic Iranian state.

It is their courage and bravery, despite many other geopolitical and national security considerations, that can explain the imperative behind the use of military force to keep Iran as far away as possible from obtaining a nuclear umbrella.
With such an umbrella in place, Iran‘s domestic situation would‘ve been reduced to a mere black box for the rest of the world. The predicament of the Iranian people would thus resemble the plight of the North Koreans. Any degree of suppression could be employed by the regime to deal with the resistance from the Iranian people while pro-democratic forces outside Iran would be forced to watch Iran‘s final descend into a country-sized gulag in an utter state of paralysis.

Without a nuclear umbrella, missile or air defenses or strong proxies, like Hezbollah as a deterrent, however, Iran‘s skies are open to US and Israeli efforts, if either of those countries or both should decide to aid an Iranian revolution.

The case of Iran holds promise for a different approach than the traditional regime change strategy. Instead, regime collapse seems like a more viable option. Rather than invading Iran, occupying it and engineering a transition from within as a military administrator, the United States can destabilize the regime enough to effectuate its collapse. In the event of a regime collapse, the responsibility to govern and democratize Iran‘s political system would fall to the Iranian dissidents, 2.000 of whom have been executed just in the last two years to give Iran the national rebirth it so desperately needs and deserves.

Military strikes on internal security forces or installations, the targeted killing or capture of regime officials, or a no fly zone are not the only instruments of power that ought to be weaponized to erode the regime‘s grip on power. A cyber offensive could cut off communications between different loyalist forces inside Iran while digital assistance can ensure open communications among the protesters and with the outside world, in spite of an internet crackdown. Strike funds can be established to paralyze the Iranian economy even further, combined with additional sanctions and maritime interdiction efforts, akin to the quarantine around Venezuela, to stop Iran‘s oil exports, thereby denying the regime its crucial oil revenue.

A new dawn for the Middle East is now in reach for the United States, if this administration proves capable of learning from the failures of past administrations when they met pivotal Iranian protests in 2009 and 2023 with inexcusable inaction, if not indifference.
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Persephonee · 26-30, F
The United States' history in successfully building up another country in the wake of military action (other than their own), is precisely zilch, nothing, and zero...with the possible exception of (West) Germany and that was because they were generally led by people capable of stringing more than one sentence together without lying or screwing up. So I suggest they stay well away from it.
CedricH · 22-25, M
@Persephonee I strongly disagree with your borderline racist and flawed misreading of history.
Persephonee · 26-30, F
@CedricH 🤨
Persephonee · 26-30, F
@Persephonee I'll accept being called flawed but I fail to see how it's borderline racist
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Persephonee · 26-30, F
@CedricH Oh my apologies if that's how what I wrote came across! It was far more that by chance (and less than wholly thoughtless leadership on both sides probably helped, though certainly no one then was perfect any more than now), postwar Germany would seem to be the one time the US didn't completely screw it up. (It occurs to me that South Korea might, alongside Germany, be an example, though it was hardly a delightful and democratic place to live until the 1980s - in both instances as postwar states it suggests that American leadership at the time had the competence to do this kind of thing).

But the long list of American interventions (not least in Iran in the 1950s) is, otherwise, not one of unmitigated success. To say nothing of merrily supporting pretty obnoxious regimes whenever it suited them (Brazil, Chile, the Taliban in the 1980s, spring immediately to mind).
CedricH · 22-25, M
@Persephonee If you meant to say that it was a chance event, then that‘s not a bigoted point of view.

In your first post you referred specifically to regime change brought about by the use of military action so the more indirect interventions in Iran and possibly Brazil are not equal to the level of US effort that usually follows a direct military intervention.

As far as the removal of Mohammad Mossadagh in 1953 is concerned, the decision to back his dismissal was the right course of action. It was appropriate because his rule destabilized Iran and might‘ve created an opening for yet another Soviet invasion, it was justified because Mossadagh, facing domestic and international pressures, displayed more and more authoritarian traits and effectively ruled as an autocrat by decree without the Iranian parliament, the Majles. And finally, the removal was constitutional because the Shah had the legal authority to dismiss his Prime Ministers at will, a prerogative he exercised with the backing of the United States.
Having said that, and despite the noteworthy socio-economic progress of Iran under the Shah, by the 1960s the constitutional monarchy was increasingly being undermined by Reza Pahlavi and transformed into a repressive absolute monarchy. That creeping self-coup should’ve been stopped by Washington, not least because it would’ve prevented the tragic Iranian revolution of 1979.

Just to point out a crucial error in your last post. The US did not back the Taliban regime in the 1990s. On the contrary, it backed the northern alliance made up of Tajik resistance fighters who opposed the Taliban caliphate.
The US supported the Mujaheddin in the 1980s to expel the Soviets who invaded Afghanistan, attempted to spread communism from Kabul to Kandahar and ruthlessly suppressed any opposition to their occupation.
The Mujaheddin were a broad, diverse coalition of insurgents who were only unified by the common goal of defeating the Red Army. After their victory over the USSR, the US lost interest in Afghanistan and civil war broke out between different factions of the former resistance. One of those factions, the Taliban, prevailed until the US removed them from power in 2001. Some of the former Mujaheddin joined the Taliban but that certainly doesn’t mean the US supported the Taliban regime in the 1990s.

It‘s always difficult to define the parameters for the success of an intervention. But let’s just focus on the military regime change efforts by the US that produced at least eventually democratic and stable governance free from tyranny.
Cuba (1898-1930s), Italy (1944), West Germany (1945), Japan (1945), Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), Panama (1990), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999), Liberia (2003) and Iraq (2003)

More specifically, the Iranian people and the more non-theocratic elites are cultivated, educated, intelligent and increasingly patriotic as well as secular. Iran has a long history of cohesiveness and constitutionalism. A transition to democracy in Tehran promises a return to Iran‘s pre-revolutionary socio-economic success, if managed diligently by United States.
@CedricH You ignore the business interest aspect of wars...
Persephonee · 26-30, F
@CedricH
Let’s just focus on the military regime change efforts by the US that produced at least eventually democratic and stable governance free from tyranny.

In other words let's ignore all the places where something else happened...

You absolutely can't separate direct military intervention from other kinds of intervention because it's the US and, at least until now, it's always had more resources to throw at something than any other nation since 1945. So sorry we have to include Vietnam, Afghanistan (twice), Iraq (several times and I'm not sure in 2025 it's exactly a place you'd want to take your girlfriend on holiday, not that Minnesota would be either right now), Iran, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Egypt, Libya, Syria (Asad is hardly missed but I don't think I'm inviting his successor to a drinking competition any time soon), etc.

Especially in the middle east, the United States doesn't have a bloody clue what it's doing. Which isn't a massive surprise from a country and culture that's a mere 250/350(ish) years old. (Pace native Americans but if you can influence Trump then I'll happily include you too. You do have first dibs on the land).
CedricH · 22-25, M
@Persephonee I didn‘t say that regime change efforts that didn’t meet with unqualified success should be flat out ignored, I tried to narrow the focus because, as I‘ve said, success can be defined in myriad ways.

Before the US ignominiously withdrew its support for the Afghan national government in 2021, Afghanistan was still confronting an insurgency, it was not a stable country, nor was it the Sweden of the Hindukusch. The government controlled areas were, however, lightyears ahead of Afghanistan under the Taliban before the US toppled their caliphate in 2001.

The Vietnam War wasn’t about either regime change in South Vietnam or in North Vietnam. It was fought to (A) defeat the Viet Cong insurgency, aided and abetted by the North and (B) to stop a northern invasion of the South. Both goals were mostly achieved by the early 1970s but the US abandonment of its ally was soon exploited by the PAVN which marched down to Saigon which is why it’s now called Ho Chi Minh city.

As for more indirect efforts to effect regime change, the US has made mistakes. For instance, in Guatemala 1954.
Yet, in most Latin American cases, including Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Ecuador, the US did not actively install the anti-communist military juntas that took over. They mostly did that by themselves in the 1970s while Nixon and Kissinger simply gave them a green light through “benevolent” neglect.
What the US should’ve done was to intervene on behalf of the elected governments of the region and stop the string of coups all over Latin America.

Fortunately, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan and their predecessors dramatically changed the US approach to right-wing dictatorships in Latin America. Unlike Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, Johnson or Eisenhower, they were inspired by Kennedy‘s vision for a free hemisphere.
Reagan in particular promoted peaceful and orderly transitions from authoritarian military rule to democratic civilian governance in Bolivia (1982), Honduras (1982), Argentina (1983), El Salvador (1984), Uruguay (1985), Brazil (1985), Guatemala (1986), Chile (1989) Paraguay (1989).

In Libya, the Obama administration dropped the ball after helping to remove Gaddafi. They did not try to stabilize the country in the aftermath of the Nato intervention on behalf of the anti-Gaddafi rebels and demonstrators. Nevertheless, that doesn’t mean the fall of his regime was an unfortunate turn of events.

In Syria, I have my fair share of doubts about Ahmad al Sharaa too and I think US pressure should be exerted now to ensure free and fair elections in Syria - the US and Israel do have enough leverage to coerce him after all.
But there‘s not a shadow of a doubt that his government is already an improvement to Bashar al Assad and his henchmen.

You can’t let perfect be the enemy of good in a world filled with imperfections. Sometimes the ouster of an intolerable regime is its own reward, even if it’s not succeeded by a government that manages to turn their country into a tourist paradise.
And if you‘re gonna ask me if I‘d rather take my girlfriend to the post-liberation Baghdad of 2026 or to Saddam Hussein’s Baghdad of 2001, I know what my answer would be.