Resignation or relief? The proper way to assess the cease-fire agreement.
Israel is a democracy and its government has made a decision that might very well be wrong but it‘s nevertheless an understandable decision.
I had high hopes for Israel‘s invasion of Gaza. I thought, the pronouncements calling for the destruction, not just the defeat, but destruction of Hamas were to be taken seriously. That the proclamations promising a future without any military or political role for Hamas in Gaza were not just rhetoric but confident, proportionate, reasonable and achievable war aims.
Unfortunately, the Israeli government lacked the necessary follow through. Admittedly, Israel faced a difficult security situation and had to focus on multiple threats simultaneously. Still, this had to be expected. The US pressure which was one of the decisive factors contributing to this cease-fire couldn’t have come as a surprise to Jerusalem either.
And in many ways the Biden administration failed Israel by delaying, temporarily limiting, halting or threatening the stark reduction of vital military supplies. The administration also counterproductively micromanaged certain operational decisions made by the IDF in its Rafah or Khan Younis offensives.
Having said that, it appears as though there wasn’t a fundamental disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem about the long-term role of Israel in Gaza. Not even concerning the post-war situation in general.
Israel‘s readiness to agree to the US brokered cease-fire agreement earlier in 2024 was essentially indicative of the absence of any concrete Israeli plans for the time after the current engagement with Hamas would’ve been concluded.
This interpretation was corroborated by the counter-terrorism approach with which Israel seriously degraded Hamas all over the enclave and defeated it in various critical sectors of Gaza. This strategy of combining air reconnaissance and intense aerial attacks with a relatively light, rotating footprint of IDF units conducting short-lived raids against isolated and crude terrorist cells (after Hamas was destroyed as a military organization) was not enough to secure control over Gaza permanently. Neither did it set up any other security force to take on such a role. More to the point, it wasn’t even designed to be effective in achieving these objectives.
The lack of a counter-insurgency strategy in connection with state capacity building efforts in Gaza, managed by Israel or a multinational force, made this cease-fire, broadly speaking, the most likely outcome of the war.
Israel‘s strategy worked in so far as that the IDF was successfully degrading, even defeating Hamas locally. The strategy produced numerous successful hostage rescues and undoubtedly increased the pressure on Hamas.
But that‘s precisely the point. It increased the pressure to negotiate not the pressure to surrender because the strategy simply wasn’t enough to coerce or effectuate the surrender of Hamas. Only a counter-insurgency paired with a long-term security presence in Gaza could’ve ensured that outcome. Alas, Israel wasn’t (and isn’t) interested in either. The practical hesitation to implement this bolder (and for the IDF and Israel rather uncommon approach) combined with the precarious hostage situation and US pressure created fertile conditions for a premature, insufficient and unsustainable cease-fire.
Israel‘s government and military are probably too confident in their ability to control events inside Gaza from afar and prevent another terrorist attack from a resurgent Hamas.
Demanding a 300 meter buffer zone along Gaza‘s borders is nothing but an admission of failure. If Israel had achieved its objective to destroy Hamas and to eliminate any future political and military role, this extra layer of security would be superfluous.
That being said, the withdrawal from Gaza can easily be reversed. Despite the worrisome commitment to vacate the Netzarim corridor, the infrastructure Israel established can be used by advancing IDF forces if the Israeli government should determine to resume military operations to prevent and disrupt Hamas‘s reconstitution as a military and political organization through unimpeded force regeneration, the diversion of humanitarian aid and smuggling. Just as IDF units can rapidly move from their positions along Gaza‘s borders back into the heart of the enclave and isolate the North from central and Southern Gaza, air attacks can be resumed at any given moment.
One thing is clear, after October 7th the reality has shifted. It‘s to be expected that Israel won’t wait until Hamas rebuilds and re-arms for the next attack. This will automatically endanger any attempted humanitarian relief effort which will be difficult to realize with unpredictable pre-emptive Israeli raids or air strikes keeping Hamas at bay, indefinitely.
It‘s another reason why a counter-insurgency would’ve been preferable to a confrontation that can (and will) re-ignite at any given moment.
It is surprising to me that the Israeli cabinet is also prepared to concede their control over the Philadelphi corridor in return for the release of more hostages as part of the planned second phase of the agreement.
In any case, Israel‘s job in Gaza isn’t finished and it won’t take long for the Israeli government and public to come to the same realization.
I had high hopes for Israel‘s invasion of Gaza. I thought, the pronouncements calling for the destruction, not just the defeat, but destruction of Hamas were to be taken seriously. That the proclamations promising a future without any military or political role for Hamas in Gaza were not just rhetoric but confident, proportionate, reasonable and achievable war aims.
Unfortunately, the Israeli government lacked the necessary follow through. Admittedly, Israel faced a difficult security situation and had to focus on multiple threats simultaneously. Still, this had to be expected. The US pressure which was one of the decisive factors contributing to this cease-fire couldn’t have come as a surprise to Jerusalem either.
And in many ways the Biden administration failed Israel by delaying, temporarily limiting, halting or threatening the stark reduction of vital military supplies. The administration also counterproductively micromanaged certain operational decisions made by the IDF in its Rafah or Khan Younis offensives.
Having said that, it appears as though there wasn’t a fundamental disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem about the long-term role of Israel in Gaza. Not even concerning the post-war situation in general.
Israel‘s readiness to agree to the US brokered cease-fire agreement earlier in 2024 was essentially indicative of the absence of any concrete Israeli plans for the time after the current engagement with Hamas would’ve been concluded.
This interpretation was corroborated by the counter-terrorism approach with which Israel seriously degraded Hamas all over the enclave and defeated it in various critical sectors of Gaza. This strategy of combining air reconnaissance and intense aerial attacks with a relatively light, rotating footprint of IDF units conducting short-lived raids against isolated and crude terrorist cells (after Hamas was destroyed as a military organization) was not enough to secure control over Gaza permanently. Neither did it set up any other security force to take on such a role. More to the point, it wasn’t even designed to be effective in achieving these objectives.
The lack of a counter-insurgency strategy in connection with state capacity building efforts in Gaza, managed by Israel or a multinational force, made this cease-fire, broadly speaking, the most likely outcome of the war.
Israel‘s strategy worked in so far as that the IDF was successfully degrading, even defeating Hamas locally. The strategy produced numerous successful hostage rescues and undoubtedly increased the pressure on Hamas.
But that‘s precisely the point. It increased the pressure to negotiate not the pressure to surrender because the strategy simply wasn’t enough to coerce or effectuate the surrender of Hamas. Only a counter-insurgency paired with a long-term security presence in Gaza could’ve ensured that outcome. Alas, Israel wasn’t (and isn’t) interested in either. The practical hesitation to implement this bolder (and for the IDF and Israel rather uncommon approach) combined with the precarious hostage situation and US pressure created fertile conditions for a premature, insufficient and unsustainable cease-fire.
Israel‘s government and military are probably too confident in their ability to control events inside Gaza from afar and prevent another terrorist attack from a resurgent Hamas.
Demanding a 300 meter buffer zone along Gaza‘s borders is nothing but an admission of failure. If Israel had achieved its objective to destroy Hamas and to eliminate any future political and military role, this extra layer of security would be superfluous.
That being said, the withdrawal from Gaza can easily be reversed. Despite the worrisome commitment to vacate the Netzarim corridor, the infrastructure Israel established can be used by advancing IDF forces if the Israeli government should determine to resume military operations to prevent and disrupt Hamas‘s reconstitution as a military and political organization through unimpeded force regeneration, the diversion of humanitarian aid and smuggling. Just as IDF units can rapidly move from their positions along Gaza‘s borders back into the heart of the enclave and isolate the North from central and Southern Gaza, air attacks can be resumed at any given moment.
One thing is clear, after October 7th the reality has shifted. It‘s to be expected that Israel won’t wait until Hamas rebuilds and re-arms for the next attack. This will automatically endanger any attempted humanitarian relief effort which will be difficult to realize with unpredictable pre-emptive Israeli raids or air strikes keeping Hamas at bay, indefinitely.
It‘s another reason why a counter-insurgency would’ve been preferable to a confrontation that can (and will) re-ignite at any given moment.
It is surprising to me that the Israeli cabinet is also prepared to concede their control over the Philadelphi corridor in return for the release of more hostages as part of the planned second phase of the agreement.
In any case, Israel‘s job in Gaza isn’t finished and it won’t take long for the Israeli government and public to come to the same realization.
