How the "True World" Finally Became a Fable
As an English lit major, I didn't read much philosophy in college, other than reading Hegel on my own to prepare for reading Marx's "Das Kapital" out of pure curiosity. I'd heard of Nietzsche, of course, but only knew G. Gordon Liddy's favorite line, "What does not kill me, makes me stronger."
But then someone told me that Nietzsche is the most entertaining philosopher, if for no other reason, he's the best writer. The following is from "The Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer" and is not only fun to read, you could spend a few hours explaining it.
But then someone told me that Nietzsche is the most entertaining philosopher, if for no other reason, he's the best writer. The following is from "The Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer" and is not only fun to read, you could spend a few hours explaining it.
1. The true world — attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the
sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")
2. The true world — unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for
the sinner who repents").
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible — it becomes
female, it becomes Christian.)
3. The true world — unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it — a
consolation, an obligation, an imperative.
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive,
pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)
4. The true world — unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown.
Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The "true" world — an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating — an idea which
has become useless and superfluous — consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush;
pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no!
With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity;
INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the
sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")
2. The true world — unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for
the sinner who repents").
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible — it becomes
female, it becomes Christian.)
3. The true world — unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it — a
consolation, an obligation, an imperative.
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive,
pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)
4. The true world — unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown.
Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The "true" world — an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating — an idea which
has become useless and superfluous — consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush;
pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no!
With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity;
INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)
