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This thread highlights a mix of valid concerns, misconceptions, and geo-strategic reality checks. Let’s unpack a few critical points with clarity and precision:
🔥 Original Post (Jokersswild):
"If Trump attacks Iran, you won't have any gas/oil, unless you go beg Russia."
This kind of alarmist framing oversimplifies the complex web of global energy flows and strategic resilience planning that Europe (especially post-Ukraine) has undertaken. While Middle Eastern instability would tighten global supply chains and raise prices, Europe would not be plunged into darkness overnight.
⚖ What’s True:
Iran’s threats to retaliate by striking Saudi, UAE, or Qatari infrastructure if attacked by the U.S. are credible—these states are rivals, and critical energy chokepoints (especially the Strait of Hormuz) are at risk.
Europe’s LNG imports from Qatar and oil from Gulf producers would take a hit. Your 15–17% disruption estimate is roughly reasonable in a high-conflict scenario.
European gas storage levels are not infinite. After a prolonged embargo or regional conflict, those reserves would shrink—causing price spikes, rationing, or industrial slowdowns.
❌ What’s Not Quite Right:
Europe wouldn’t have to “beg Russia.”
Russia is already effectively out of the European market due to sanctions and sabotage (e.g. Nord Stream). No major European government is pivoting back to Moscow.
Iran doesn’t export to the West much.
Due to sanctions, Iran sells oil to China and a few others through gray markets. If war broke out, Iran’s own exports would halt. The shock comes not from Europe losing Iranian oil, but from collateral damage to Gulf infrastructure.
The U.S. is not fully insulated.
As @ElwoodBlues correctly points out, U.S. refineries are designed for heavy crude. Disruption to Gulf flows would create bottlenecks, especially for diesel, jet fuel, and shipping fuel—impacting trucking, farming, and industry.
✅ Smart Contributions:
@ninalanyon is correct: Europe has diversified suppliers — USA, Norway, Algeria, Qatar, etc. LNG terminals have been fast-tracked and storage policies toughened post-Ukraine.
@Jenny1234 adds useful context. Europe’s supply sources have already shifted significantly.
@ElwoodBlues is dead-on about the difference between light tight oil (LTO) and heavy sour crude. This isn’t just technical nitpicking—it affects how quickly the U.S. can pivot in a crisis.
🧠 The Bigger Picture:
If Trump bombs Iran:
Oil prices could spike globally, possibly above $150/barrel temporarily.
LNG markets tighten, especially if Qatar is targeted.
Europe faces short-term pain, but its shift away from Russian dependence means it’s not helpless.
U.S. refineries could experience mismatches in crude inputs vs demand for diesel/heavy products.
China, India, and the Global South may benefit from discounted crude as war premiums push sanctioned oil into side markets.
💡 Strategic Takeaway:
Instead of blaming “Europeans” or “Americans” as monolithic actors, this situation illustrates the interdependent vulnerabilities of a globalized energy system. Everyone would be affected—but not equally, and not fatally.
🔥 Original Post (Jokersswild):
"If Trump attacks Iran, you won't have any gas/oil, unless you go beg Russia."
This kind of alarmist framing oversimplifies the complex web of global energy flows and strategic resilience planning that Europe (especially post-Ukraine) has undertaken. While Middle Eastern instability would tighten global supply chains and raise prices, Europe would not be plunged into darkness overnight.
⚖ What’s True:
Iran’s threats to retaliate by striking Saudi, UAE, or Qatari infrastructure if attacked by the U.S. are credible—these states are rivals, and critical energy chokepoints (especially the Strait of Hormuz) are at risk.
Europe’s LNG imports from Qatar and oil from Gulf producers would take a hit. Your 15–17% disruption estimate is roughly reasonable in a high-conflict scenario.
European gas storage levels are not infinite. After a prolonged embargo or regional conflict, those reserves would shrink—causing price spikes, rationing, or industrial slowdowns.
❌ What’s Not Quite Right:
Europe wouldn’t have to “beg Russia.”
Russia is already effectively out of the European market due to sanctions and sabotage (e.g. Nord Stream). No major European government is pivoting back to Moscow.
Iran doesn’t export to the West much.
Due to sanctions, Iran sells oil to China and a few others through gray markets. If war broke out, Iran’s own exports would halt. The shock comes not from Europe losing Iranian oil, but from collateral damage to Gulf infrastructure.
The U.S. is not fully insulated.
As @ElwoodBlues correctly points out, U.S. refineries are designed for heavy crude. Disruption to Gulf flows would create bottlenecks, especially for diesel, jet fuel, and shipping fuel—impacting trucking, farming, and industry.
✅ Smart Contributions:
@ninalanyon is correct: Europe has diversified suppliers — USA, Norway, Algeria, Qatar, etc. LNG terminals have been fast-tracked and storage policies toughened post-Ukraine.
@Jenny1234 adds useful context. Europe’s supply sources have already shifted significantly.
@ElwoodBlues is dead-on about the difference between light tight oil (LTO) and heavy sour crude. This isn’t just technical nitpicking—it affects how quickly the U.S. can pivot in a crisis.
🧠 The Bigger Picture:
If Trump bombs Iran:
Oil prices could spike globally, possibly above $150/barrel temporarily.
LNG markets tighten, especially if Qatar is targeted.
Europe faces short-term pain, but its shift away from Russian dependence means it’s not helpless.
U.S. refineries could experience mismatches in crude inputs vs demand for diesel/heavy products.
China, India, and the Global South may benefit from discounted crude as war premiums push sanctioned oil into side markets.
💡 Strategic Takeaway:
Instead of blaming “Europeans” or “Americans” as monolithic actors, this situation illustrates the interdependent vulnerabilities of a globalized energy system. Everyone would be affected—but not equally, and not fatally.
Ferise1 · 46-50, M
@FrogManSometimesLooksBothWays that’s ChatGPT huh
@Ferise1 Sure thing. The world's smartest machine! 🤣