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I Believe In God

I enjoy the philosophy behind the existence of God. My favorite proofs for His existence are Thomas Aquinas' five ways, which are sadly quite terribly misunderstood by most people.
The second and fifth ways are my favorites, but here is the second way, a proof of God from efficient causation:

1. There are series of efficient causes of things in the world.
2. Nothing exists prior to itself.
3. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself, because to be the efficient cause of itself, it would have to be prior to itself.
4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results.
5. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists.
6. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no first member, and no things existing now.
7. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Premise 1 is pretty obvious. Efficient causes are the usual causes that we see in day to day life. For example, electricity causes a light bulb to turn on.
Premises 2 and 3 go together. Nothing can cause itself, because a cause has to be prior to its effect. However, what Aquinas does not say is that everything has a cause. Things are either caused by something else or are entirely uncaused.
Premises 4 and 5 are pretty self-evident.
Premise 6 is one which most people misinterpret to be speaking of an entirely different type of causation than what Aquinas had in mind. For Aquinas, there were two different types of causal series.
1) Accidentally ordered series. In these series, the effect is not dependent on the cause for its existence. An example of such a series is people having children. The children continue to exist and produce more offspring even after their parents die.
2) Essentially ordered series. In these series, the effect depends on the cause for its existence. An example of this would be someone's hand moving a stick which in turn is moving a stone. Once the hand stops moving, both the stick and stone stop moving. They depend on the movement of the hand for their movement.
Aquinas wrote elsewhere that he did not believe it was possible to philosophically prove that accidentally ordered causal series could not go on to infinity. Therefore, he is talking about essentially ordered series.
So, if we go back to the stick pushing the stone scenario, the stone is moving because the stick is moving, the stick is moving because the hand is moving, the hand is moving because certain motor neurons are firing, and these are firing because of others, and it keeps going back and back and back, but if there is no first member in the series, there is no way the stone can be moving at all. Aquinas concludes that there must be an uncaused cause sustaining things in existence at every moment, and that this cause is God. It's not just the watchmaker God of modern intelligent design arguments. It is a God continually, actively, sustaining His creation, which I think is a very beautiful picture of Him.

I am indebted to Edward Feser's book Aquinas for this information.


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DarksBane
1-4 are unproven and quite possibly wrong. Nothing has ever been observed to contradict these four statements, but that doesn't mean that nothing in the potentially extreme oddity of unobserved reality does. Also, they eat the idea of an unmoved mover. If nothing can exist without a cause, then said mover has to have a cause, thus making it moved and incapable of solving your 'problem.'-Statement #6 is unproven. There's no reason why a series of events can't infinitely regress the way they can infinitely progress.-Statement 7 is generally bullcrap. Even if this unmoved mover exists, it could've been anything from the quiet birth of spacetime to the violent death of a randomly spawning star. Neither of those two things are sentient, omnipotent, etc., contrary to the description of God.
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EDIT:
1-4 are valid claims. I had initially mistaken them for a similar set of claims.
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
Read the rest of the experience. Aquinas never said everything has a cause. Just that whatever has a cause can't cause itself. I explained premise 6 and how it is speaking of an entirely different type of causality. As to the conclusion, Aquinas has many further proofs about God's attributes.
Isayoldchap
I must disagree. It is impossible for a thing to cause or create itself. Numbers one through four are simple logic. If an exercise in reason, combined with a complete lack of empirical evidence running contrary to such reason are insufficient to convince you, nothing will. As far as number six is concerned, it must be understood in light of number five, which is predicated upon numbers one through four. If nothing can cause itself, then what caused the first thing in the universe? This is a question that the lower ("natural") sciences cannot answer, but that theology answers perfectly. Your response to number seven is based upon outlandish pseudo-scientific speculation that stands at variance with everything definitely known about the universe and is generally propagated by scientists whose favorite leisure activity is attempting to disprove the existence of God (Hawking comes immediately to mind).
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
*(and whatever is uncaused can't cause itself either)
DarksBane
"Numbers one through four are simple logic." If this is true, then lay it out. You need to use logical proofs, not random assertions you arbitrarily deem reasonable. All that supports one through four is a lack of proof of the contrary, which really doesn't get us anywhere considering the lack of knowledge we have regarding the time before the Big Bang. We think there's nothing that can go without a cause independent of itself in the universe in which we reside. That doesn't mean there's nothing without a cause outside of the universe, assuming that anything with in the universe exists. For all we know, the apparent rules that govern spacetime only govern spacetime and that which it contains.
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"Your response to number seven is based upon outlandish pseudo-scientific speculation..." No, sir. My responses were examples; random guesses designed to show you that there are other explanations. I'm not saying that any of that which I mentioned is true, hence the word 'could,' in fact, I find it rather unlikely that any of those answers were even remotely accurate. I don't know what caused the rest of events (if anything), but do you want to know what? Neither do you. Theology is not a science; it is not supported by evidence, and is therefore a guess to answer as well.
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The pursuit knowledge is not about merely explaining things; many things can be explained in multiple ways, most of which are wrong. To feel confident in a claim, one must prove that his/her explanation is the correct one, usually with evidence.
DarksBane
I find the distinction between these two "types" of causation rather silly. In one, force is continuously applied and in the other, force is not continuously applied. There is still no way to prove that an infinite regression of appliers of force cannot exist.
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To what proofs do you refer?
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
In essentially ordered causal series, none of the later members in the series could exist at all if there were no former members continually causing their existence. There can't be an infinite regress because there would be no first member, and such series require a first member.
I refer to pretty much the whole first book of the Summa Theologica after the dice ways
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
1. There are a series of efficient causes of things in the world. ---- pretty self-evident. It's like saying there are trees or spiders in the world because we have seen them.
2 & 3. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself because then it would have to be prior to itself, which would be impossible. ---- this is just a statement that nothing can cause itself. It leaves open two options: either a thing is caused by something else or is entirely uncaused.
4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results. ---- if the electricity turning on a light bulb does not exist, neither does the result of the bulb shining exist.
These are pretty straightforward if you ask me. What objections do you have in particular?

And as for the conclusion, I have already stated that Aquinas devotes a huge portion of the Summa to proving what attributes God must have.
Isayoldchap
The whole thing is a proof. That is why it is called the second PROOF of God's existence. If you accept that number one is true, the rest follows as it should. Number one, however, is a postulate and cannot be broken into further constituent proofs because it is meant to be quite obvious, that is why Aquinas began there. Still, nothing, in any field of science at any time in the past or the present has ever proven or even reasonably suggested that something can occur without a cause. Matter is acted upon by energy which can be gained only by interactions with other matter. This is true from the planetary scale to the atomic one. If you and the scientific community want to doubt the evidence of your own judgement and your own senses, then I wish you the joy of it, but while you fumble about in the dark seeking the satisfactory (and atheistic) response that you will never find, I shall know as certainly as I know that water runs downhill that the one, triune God is the single efficient cause of the universe. By the way, theology most certainly is a science. It is, in fact, the mother of all sciences because all of the most significant truths can be derived from its, since God is a source of absolute truth and cannot deceive. The fact that Our Lord and Savior does not deign to be experimented upon does not disqualify theology. All of that being said, I will leave you to your delusions and bid you good day.
DarksBane
The first statement works, but your claim "and [an essentially ordered causal series] requires a first member" needs to be proven. Anyway, please name at least one proof specifically, whether its in that book or not, that proves that this first cause is god, or that it has the traits described as being those of god.
DarksBane
That pretty much all works for me, thank you. Now, I understand these claims to a greater degree. I've learned that my objection is only to #6 and 7.
DarksBane
"Still, nothing in any field of science at any time in the past or the present has ever proven or even reasonably suggested that something can occur without a cause." If you accept the claims of the uploader's argument, specifically #6, then one must conclude that something can and did occur without a cause. Yes, matter/energy is almost always observed to respond to events, but you must remember there's more in the universe than just matter/energy. Specifically, spacetime noticeably exists other than these relatively concrete things with mysterious properties. We don't know what else exists; there could be another building block, perhaps one even more foundational to everything we know that humans have never observed. The point is, we don't know how far the seemingly concrete nature of cause/effect relationships extends, and thus, we can't prove that there is nothing that is not bound by it.
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Your claim that theology is a science is (if valid even then) contingent on the claim that there is a god, and this god is the source of significant truths from which theology is derived. Prove that your god is the source of significant truths from which theology is derived.
DarksBane
Where is it in the Summa? I'm looking with numbers, names, things I can actually work with. You can't use an argument if you don't specify what the argument is.
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
I believe this explanation makes sense:
"...consider a flower pot suspended by a chain of rings. The bottom ring holds up the flower pot, but it holds up the flower pot only in virtue of being held up by the ring above it which, in turn, holds up the ring and the flower pot only because it is held up by the ring above it. Each ring is a held-up holder up, if you will. In such a series, each ring is simultaneously active in holding up the posterior rings and passive in being held up by the prior rings and whatever holds them up. Aquinas’ argument is meant to rule out the possibility of this series of rings continuing on in infinitum without coming to something that is independently stable." https://www.academia.edu/4415427/There_Must_Be_A_First_Why_Thomas_Aquinas_Rejects_Infinite_Essentially_Ordered_Causal_Series

Proofs that the God described in the five ways must have certain attributes are pretty much everything in numbers 3-26 under The One God here: http://newadvent.org/summa/1.htm.
DarksBane
The problem with an infinite series of chain links are fairly unique to that problem. There is no hypothetical body of matter large enough to attract chain links that are any distance away from it. This would require infinite gravity, which probably can't exist. If such a thing did exist, then it would destroy the chain. An infinite chain would require infinite matter to exist, which isn't known to exist.
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A better example may be two objects orbiting one another perpetually in a perfect vacuum. Both objects act on each other continuously, and this balance would stop if one object were to somehow stop acting upon the other. The movement of one object allows for the movement of the other object, which allows for the movement of the other object...
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I'll send you my response to the Summa when I can find that to which you refer; unfortunately, that link doesn't work.
DarksBane
I haven't dug into Question 3 yet, as I sense that it will build upon Question 2. I've been looking under the title of Question 2 and I have objections.
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"But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident." Question 2 Article 1
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My objection is the use of the fallacy of equivocation in this proof. To say that something exists as an idea is very different from saying that something exists in reality. When we say that something exists as an idea, it means that some unique and easily recognizable series of neurons is firing off in our brains. These things we call ideas can contradict reality and, in some cases, themselves. So to claim that the qualities of an idea alone, qualities integrated into its definition and not the world itself can prove that the thing's existence in reality is a mistake.
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Also, it's worth noting that greatness is also all in our heads, so there's no reason to believe that that which is outside of the noggin responds to such a property of things at all.
DarksBane
"The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God." Question 2 Article 3
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There's a blatantly false statement in this proof. It's obviously a shortage of knowledge I can understand, given the time in which Aquinas lived. The hottest things in the world are not fires at all; the hottest things are the cores of stars, and they are hot not because of fire, but because of friction. Some things are hot for reasons other than stars; any large enough body of matter will begin to churn about given the necessary heat. Those bodies of ultimately exist because of the intervention of stars earlier, but the first stars, at least as theorized by astronomers worldwide, were not catalyzed by any other stars because there weren't any other stars to cause their existence in the first place. Either way, it's not some direct and reliable relationship between such stars and heat.
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But even if it were, that wouldn't prove that the same is true of all such qualities. Some foods are more disgusting than others, but there is no pinnacle of disgust from which all disgust arises. Some people are uglier than others, but there is no pinnacle of ugliness from which all ugliness arises.
DarksBane
"We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God." Question 2 Article 3
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First of all, the term "best result" in this proof is subjective. In order to refute this point, I must define the term. I will rewrite my refutation if you find this definition to be faulty and if the fault necessitates rewriting. >The best result is the rise and survival of humanity.<
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Even with our limited knowledge of the universe, it is fair to say that some things do not aid humanity at all. There are galaxies so far away from Earth that they can't be seen with the naked eye or even most telescopes, and quite a few of them. In fact, it's thought that most of the universe cannot be observed by humans at all. It's fair to say that that which is so far away from humans that it cannot be observed does not assist us in our struggle for survival.
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We do not know how much there is in general. We have a general idea of how big the universe may be, but we do not know how many universes there are. The universe is an unimaginably colossal place; perhaps we should expect a relatively small company of things within it to act in a way that benefits humans by absolute chance, especially considering that humans could only arise where things benefit humans in the first place. Also consider that organisms in general, according to the scientific explanation of biological history, adapt to survive in the environments we live in, allowing us to live in a wider range of environments than one would otherwise assume.
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Moreover, it is not known how many universes, or even multiverses exist. Perhaps there are so many that the odds of one of them being fit for human life could grow extremely high.
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The proofs I have not refuted in Summa Theologica: Question 2 refer to the necessity of an end to infinite regression, and God as that end. I find it fairly foolish to simply define god as being something such as "an unmoved mover" without first proving any other traits about said mover.
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The point of the last few comments I left were to reduce the 'god' Aquinas 'proved' to a series of ends to regressions. I'll get to the traits later and see what needs countering and what doesn't.
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Thanks for reading all of the comments I left if you did, and if you didn't, it's okay. I understand. Although I find you misguided at the moment, I do think you have great potential, or if nothing else, skill in calm apologetic. I'll be back.
DarksBane
I don't care about the infinite regressions argument; it is a stupid, annoying, mind-numbing mess of trivial technicalities. You can win if you want.
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
What you quote is an objection that Aquinas refutes in the article. Aquinas holds that the existence of God is not self-evident to us. He always sets up his writing by first stating objections and then refuting them. This one in particular is Saint Anselm's ontological argument, and I completely agree with you that it is flawed.
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
What Aquinas was referring to here is specifically the transcendentals, which are qualities that all being, or everything, possesses. Beauty, oneness, truth, goodness, and being were qualities that Aquinas held to be present in all things.
His statement about fire was an error of the physics of his time, so that is understandable. But nowadays we would say that heat is present wherever there is molecular motion, and absolute zero would be a temperature at which molecular motion stops. We say things are colder or hotter, but that really refers to a thing possessing more or less molecular motion. All things still possess some degree of heat as long as there is motion. If there is an absolute hot, then all things that possess heat resemble it in varying degrees. One might argue that the opposite applies, and that all things resemble coldness in their closeness to absolute zero. But I would argue that anything that possesses the slightest degree of heat resembles absolute hot in that it possesses some heat. Absolute coldness stands on its own in possessing no heat whatsoever.
It's the same with the transcendentals. Everything that exists possesses some degree of beauty, oneness, truth, and goodness. "oneness" just refers to a thing's unity and identity as a whole, so it's easier to focus on truth, beauty, and goodness. "Truth" here must be understood not in the sense of true or false statements, but in being true to one's nature. Something that is more beautiful is arguably something better and truer than something less beautiful. Nevertheless, all things possess these qualities, and a complete lack of them would result in non-being. Because all existing things possess these qualities in varying degrees, Aquinas argues that there must be a maximum that is goodness itself, truth itself, and beauty itself, and that all things resemble it.
I hope that makes sense.
darkanddesolate · 26-30, F
By "best result" here, Aquinas doesn't mean a single result applying to all of humanity. He is talking about each and every thing in nature acting "always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result." He believed that teleology, final causes, or purpose existed in nature. An acorn would suffice as an example. Acorns always grow, or try to grow, into trees. If they are eaten or not planted, they are prevented from doing so, but they still contain the ability to do so. If they are planted in bad soil, they might grow a little bit but then die. Nevertheless, they are still acting towards the end of growing into a big oak tree.

So, why is it that acorns lacking intelligence consistently grow into trees? This also can be applied to evolution. Why is it that all matter tended towards the result of producing life and higher forms of life?

For Aquinas, matter lacking intelligence cannot possibly tend towards such ordered and consistent results on both smaller and bigger scales, unless it has a creator continually directing them towards their results. There cannot be final causality or purpose without efficient causality.