Oh, when will they ever learn? Oh, when will they ever learn?
I finally got fed up with the fanciful notion that the U.S. could have somehow knocked the Japanese out of the war early by invading, capturing and holding Iwo Jima in December 1942.
So, I unloaded with a full broadside.
[media=https://youtu.be/NiAcZt-ldeA]
Note to our British and Australian friends. I think you will get a kick out of the things I said!
[media=https://youtu.be/xMiPk3-fqs0]
My replies are found under the comment by @ToIsleOfView and his remark that "It was a mistake for the navy to go to the aid of the Brits in Australia in 1942. ..."
Here was my last retort. Kind of like dropping the a-bomb. And I didn't even get into the logistics of his fantasy.
from @beckyromero2131
So, I unloaded with a full broadside.
[media=https://youtu.be/NiAcZt-ldeA]
Note to our British and Australian friends. I think you will get a kick out of the things I said!
[media=https://youtu.be/xMiPk3-fqs0]
My replies are found under the comment by @ToIsleOfView and his remark that "It was a mistake for the navy to go to the aid of the Brits in Australia in 1942. ..."
Here was my last retort. Kind of like dropping the a-bomb. And I didn't even get into the logistics of his fantasy.
from @beckyromero2131
@ToIsleOfView Aside the fact that President Roosevelt would not have ordered a strategy that told our Allies to, bluntly go f*** themselves, I won't even begin to go into the many tactical issues with your "Invade Iwo Jima in December 1942." Because you don't seem to have an understanding of the command responsibilities of the Pacific theater in 1942. That is evidence on all the bent up hatred for Gen. Douglas MacArthur, blaming him for things for which was NOT his responsibility or fault.
When MacArthur was recalled to active duty on July 26, 1941 he was given command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). This, for all practical purposes, consisted of U.S. and Philippine forces in the Philippines. But it stretches credulity to think that MacArthur's forces could have held out indefinitely in light of the forces that Japan committed to the invasion and capture of the Philippines. The War Department wisely understood this. Which is why shortly after the war began, a convoy heading towards the Philippines and carrying about 4,600 troops and ammunition and escorted by the heavy cruiser Pensacola was ordered to divert to Australia. (Initially the War Department was going to divert the convoy to Pearl Harbor, but realizing what a bad message that would send about abandoning U.S. troops in the Philippines it was diverted to Australia instead on President Roosevelt's orders; the U.S. 41st Infantry Division was similarly redirected to Australia in early 1942.)
Pretty much every high-ranking officer in the U.S. military underestimated Japanese capabilities at the start of the war, including Gen. MacArthur. And you would have fallen into that same category!
That said, you are mistaken about Formosa. Gen. MacArthur did indeed order the 5th Air Force to attack Japanese bases there shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. But all the B-17s that had taken off earlier and were in a holding pattern had landed to be refueled. It was by a pure stroke of luck that the Japanese attack hit Clark Field shortly after their return and nearly all were destroyed or damaged. However, MacArthur's forces simply did not have enough adequate fighters to counter the Japanese attack anyway. The U.S. P-40s could not reach the altitude of the Japanese bombers and both the P-40s and their pilots were quite inferior to the Japanese Zeros and their highly trained and experienced pilots. Whether the 5th Air Force would have been destroyed on December 8th, 1941 or within the week at various airfields around the Philippines the only thing certain is that it would have been destroyed. Unless you have have flown them to where exactly? In March 1942, Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to evacuate to Australia.
The Doolittle Raid on Japan took place on April 18, 1942. Roosevelt wanted the Japanese to see their homeland was not invulnerable to attack and also to provide a boost to U.S. morale. The damage done by the attack was superficial but it directly led to the Japanese Naval General Staff approving Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto plan to invade and capture Midway Island and to sink any counter attack by U.S. carrier forces.
Gen. Wainwright surrendered all U.S. troops in the Philippines to the Japanese on May 8, 1842 - nearly a month BEFORE the Battle of Midway. But it was at this time (4 to 8 May 1942( that the Battle of the Coral Sea took place. Except that it wouldn't - because you say to hell with the Brits and Aussies. So Lexington doesn't get sunk nor is the Yorktown damaged. But the result is the Japanese successfully invade and capture Port Moresby. The IJN also doesn't suffer any carrier pilot losses in a battle that doesn't take place in your revised history. So the light carrier Shōhō is not sunk, nor is the fleet carrier Shōkaku damaged. The Shōkaku and Zuikaku therefore would participate in Operation MI as Yamamoto had initially envisioned.
With all six fleet carriers of the Kidō Butai participating in the Midway operation, the Japanese capture the island and the U.S. looses an important submarine base. Not to mention the nearly certain disastrous defeat the outmatched USN would suffer in trying to counter Admiral Nagumo's powerful carrier force. And before you attempt to counter with "but we broke their code," I would point out that it was the results in the Battle of Coral Sea that helped strengthen Admiral Nimitz' argument to Washington that sending Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown to Midway AHEAD of Nagumo's attack. If Nimitz responds at all, it is AFTER the Kidō Butai is discovered shortly before or after the bombing of Midway. The Japanese had concluded that the United States could not afford to abandon Midway uncontested and had planned for attacking the U.S. carriers as they approached Midway.
As for Guadalcanal, it is now taken and secured by the Japanese with no U.S. resistance. Australia is cut off, making it hazardous for U.S. submarines to operate from Australian bases. Who knows. The Aussie government might flip the bird right back at you! But in any case, with Port Moresby and Guadalcanal under firm Japanese control, all bases in northern and eastern Australia come under repeated attack.
And finally, since you blamed MacArthur for the fall of Guam, Wake and the for battles on Guadalcanal, I would be remiss in failing to point out that those areas were NOT under his command!
Guadalcanal was under the responsibility of the U.S. navy, not MacArthur. Overall command of the Pacific Ocean Areas fell under Admiral Chester Nimitz. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley was in direct command of Guadalcanal (later replaced by Admiral William Halsey).
As for Wake and Guam, they were also outside of MacArthur's command jurisdiction. As for Guam's inadequate defenses, that can be traced to the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 that prohibited its fortification.
But, go on ahead and try to send the bulk of the Pacific Fleet to Iwo Jima in December 1942, perhaps with the World War I battleships slowing the task force to 23 knots or slower. With the Japanese firmly in control of the Marshall Islands, Midway Island, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Guam, Wake Island and the Marianas it can be expected that without land-based fighter protection, the U.S. task force might be intercepted and destroyed before it even reaches Iwo Jima.
And even if the task force does make it to Iwo Jima, Mother Nature would have a nasty surprise, too. Tropical Storm Thirty formed on December 13th east of Mindanao in the Philippine Sea as a weak tropical disturbance. Moving rapidly northward at speeds up to 16 knots (30 km/h), the storm accelerated before recurving westward toward the Philippines, tracking over open waters without landfall. It reached a latitude of 16.5°N by December 16th, then shifted slightly northeast as it weakened. The short-lived system dissipated on December 17th.
When MacArthur was recalled to active duty on July 26, 1941 he was given command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). This, for all practical purposes, consisted of U.S. and Philippine forces in the Philippines. But it stretches credulity to think that MacArthur's forces could have held out indefinitely in light of the forces that Japan committed to the invasion and capture of the Philippines. The War Department wisely understood this. Which is why shortly after the war began, a convoy heading towards the Philippines and carrying about 4,600 troops and ammunition and escorted by the heavy cruiser Pensacola was ordered to divert to Australia. (Initially the War Department was going to divert the convoy to Pearl Harbor, but realizing what a bad message that would send about abandoning U.S. troops in the Philippines it was diverted to Australia instead on President Roosevelt's orders; the U.S. 41st Infantry Division was similarly redirected to Australia in early 1942.)
Pretty much every high-ranking officer in the U.S. military underestimated Japanese capabilities at the start of the war, including Gen. MacArthur. And you would have fallen into that same category!
That said, you are mistaken about Formosa. Gen. MacArthur did indeed order the 5th Air Force to attack Japanese bases there shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. But all the B-17s that had taken off earlier and were in a holding pattern had landed to be refueled. It was by a pure stroke of luck that the Japanese attack hit Clark Field shortly after their return and nearly all were destroyed or damaged. However, MacArthur's forces simply did not have enough adequate fighters to counter the Japanese attack anyway. The U.S. P-40s could not reach the altitude of the Japanese bombers and both the P-40s and their pilots were quite inferior to the Japanese Zeros and their highly trained and experienced pilots. Whether the 5th Air Force would have been destroyed on December 8th, 1941 or within the week at various airfields around the Philippines the only thing certain is that it would have been destroyed. Unless you have have flown them to where exactly? In March 1942, Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to evacuate to Australia.
The Doolittle Raid on Japan took place on April 18, 1942. Roosevelt wanted the Japanese to see their homeland was not invulnerable to attack and also to provide a boost to U.S. morale. The damage done by the attack was superficial but it directly led to the Japanese Naval General Staff approving Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto plan to invade and capture Midway Island and to sink any counter attack by U.S. carrier forces.
Gen. Wainwright surrendered all U.S. troops in the Philippines to the Japanese on May 8, 1842 - nearly a month BEFORE the Battle of Midway. But it was at this time (4 to 8 May 1942( that the Battle of the Coral Sea took place. Except that it wouldn't - because you say to hell with the Brits and Aussies. So Lexington doesn't get sunk nor is the Yorktown damaged. But the result is the Japanese successfully invade and capture Port Moresby. The IJN also doesn't suffer any carrier pilot losses in a battle that doesn't take place in your revised history. So the light carrier Shōhō is not sunk, nor is the fleet carrier Shōkaku damaged. The Shōkaku and Zuikaku therefore would participate in Operation MI as Yamamoto had initially envisioned.
With all six fleet carriers of the Kidō Butai participating in the Midway operation, the Japanese capture the island and the U.S. looses an important submarine base. Not to mention the nearly certain disastrous defeat the outmatched USN would suffer in trying to counter Admiral Nagumo's powerful carrier force. And before you attempt to counter with "but we broke their code," I would point out that it was the results in the Battle of Coral Sea that helped strengthen Admiral Nimitz' argument to Washington that sending Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown to Midway AHEAD of Nagumo's attack. If Nimitz responds at all, it is AFTER the Kidō Butai is discovered shortly before or after the bombing of Midway. The Japanese had concluded that the United States could not afford to abandon Midway uncontested and had planned for attacking the U.S. carriers as they approached Midway.
As for Guadalcanal, it is now taken and secured by the Japanese with no U.S. resistance. Australia is cut off, making it hazardous for U.S. submarines to operate from Australian bases. Who knows. The Aussie government might flip the bird right back at you! But in any case, with Port Moresby and Guadalcanal under firm Japanese control, all bases in northern and eastern Australia come under repeated attack.
And finally, since you blamed MacArthur for the fall of Guam, Wake and the for battles on Guadalcanal, I would be remiss in failing to point out that those areas were NOT under his command!
Guadalcanal was under the responsibility of the U.S. navy, not MacArthur. Overall command of the Pacific Ocean Areas fell under Admiral Chester Nimitz. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley was in direct command of Guadalcanal (later replaced by Admiral William Halsey).
As for Wake and Guam, they were also outside of MacArthur's command jurisdiction. As for Guam's inadequate defenses, that can be traced to the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 that prohibited its fortification.
But, go on ahead and try to send the bulk of the Pacific Fleet to Iwo Jima in December 1942, perhaps with the World War I battleships slowing the task force to 23 knots or slower. With the Japanese firmly in control of the Marshall Islands, Midway Island, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Guam, Wake Island and the Marianas it can be expected that without land-based fighter protection, the U.S. task force might be intercepted and destroyed before it even reaches Iwo Jima.
And even if the task force does make it to Iwo Jima, Mother Nature would have a nasty surprise, too. Tropical Storm Thirty formed on December 13th east of Mindanao in the Philippine Sea as a weak tropical disturbance. Moving rapidly northward at speeds up to 16 knots (30 km/h), the storm accelerated before recurving westward toward the Philippines, tracking over open waters without landfall. It reached a latitude of 16.5°N by December 16th, then shifted slightly northeast as it weakened. The short-lived system dissipated on December 17th.
36-40, F