Pax Americana is over. What comes next will be worse.
Pax Americana is over. What comes next will be worse.
by Nicholas Creel, opinion contributor - The Hill
03/01/25 8:00 AM ET
For nearly eight decades, humanity has benefited from an international order built and maintained by American power.
This “Pax Americana” — characterized by relatively stable international relations, expanding global trade, unprecedented prosperity and the absence of great-power conflict — is abruptly coming to an end. What follows will shock all who have grown accustomed to its benefits.
The post-World War II order wasn’t perfect, but it delivered remarkable outcomes. American leadership produced the longest period without a major war between great powers in modern history. Global poverty declined dramatically, with the number of people living in extreme poverty falling from over half the world’s population in the 1950s to less than 10 percent today.
Democratic governance expanded to unprecedented levels. International institutions, from the U.N. to the World Trade Organization, created forums for the peaceful resolution of disputes. This all occurred under the umbrella of American military supremacy and commitment to a rules-based international system.
That era is ending, not with a decisive event, but through intentional abdication by the U.S.
Recent demands by President Trump — attempting to purchase Greenland from Denmark against its will, threatening punitive tariffs against allies and neighbors, and coercing Ukraine to surrender mineral wealth in exchange for continued U.S. support — signal a fundamental shift. America is abandoning its role as system administrator in favor of becoming just another self-interested great power. The consequences will be extensive and severe.
Security guarantees that prevented armed conflict will weaken. For decades, potential aggressors were deterred by the knowledge that attacking American allies would trigger U.S. intervention. With that credibility eroded, opportunistic powers will test boundaries. Taiwan is in greater danger of an invasion by China, and the Baltic states and other nations bordering Russia are more vulnerable.
Smaller states will increasingly become pawns in great-power competitions. During Pax Americana, small nations could navigate international relations with reasonable autonomy, protected by American-backed international norms. In the emerging multipolar system, these countries will face coercion from regional powers seeking to establish spheres of influence.
We’re already witnessing this dynamic with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s increasingly aggressive posturing in the South China Sea. Like circling sharks that smell blood in the water, hostile powers are preparing for a return to a world where, as Thucydides famously wrote, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Major wars between states will become much more common than it was over the last several decades.
Relatedly, the power imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear states will become more pronounced and dangerous. During Pax Americana, the U.S. nuclear umbrella protected allies, reducing incentives for nuclear proliferation. As this protection becomes unreliable, countries will face a stark choice: develop nuclear weapons or accept vulnerability. The result will likely be a cascade of nuclear proliferation, increasing the risk of miscalculation, accidents and regional arms races.
Economic prosperity will suffer as the integrated global economy fragments. The American-led order created ideal conditions for globalization: secure shipping lanes, predictable rules and relatively free trade. Without a great power enforcing these norms, protectionism will rise, supply chains will localize and economic efficiency will decline. The poorest nations, which benefited greatly from integration into global markets, will suffer most as investment retreats to safer havens. Wealthier nations will see a decline in their standard of living as access to markets with cheaper labor is blocked off.
The tragedy is that many Americans, frustrated by the costs of global leadership, fail to recognize the many indirect benefits they’ve received from it. It is true that American hegemony wasn’t free to maintain, but by bearing those costs we were able to maintain a world remarkably conducive to U.S. interests. The era of stable markets for exports, reliable access to resources and few direct security threats is ending as we walk away from our role as a relatively benevolent hegemon.
The coming disorder will hurt Americans more than they realize, through increased military threats and economic disruptions. Those celebrating America’s retreat from global leadership will soon learn that their wish was granted on a monkey’s paw. The world that follows Pax Americana will be poorer, more dangerous and less free — a harsh lesson in how much better the imperfect American-led order was than the alternatives that history offers.
Nicholas Creel is an associate professor of business law at Georgia College & State University. His views as expressed here are not necessarily those of any employer or other institution.
by Nicholas Creel, opinion contributor - The Hill
03/01/25 8:00 AM ET
For nearly eight decades, humanity has benefited from an international order built and maintained by American power.
This “Pax Americana” — characterized by relatively stable international relations, expanding global trade, unprecedented prosperity and the absence of great-power conflict — is abruptly coming to an end. What follows will shock all who have grown accustomed to its benefits.
The post-World War II order wasn’t perfect, but it delivered remarkable outcomes. American leadership produced the longest period without a major war between great powers in modern history. Global poverty declined dramatically, with the number of people living in extreme poverty falling from over half the world’s population in the 1950s to less than 10 percent today.
Democratic governance expanded to unprecedented levels. International institutions, from the U.N. to the World Trade Organization, created forums for the peaceful resolution of disputes. This all occurred under the umbrella of American military supremacy and commitment to a rules-based international system.
That era is ending, not with a decisive event, but through intentional abdication by the U.S.
Recent demands by President Trump — attempting to purchase Greenland from Denmark against its will, threatening punitive tariffs against allies and neighbors, and coercing Ukraine to surrender mineral wealth in exchange for continued U.S. support — signal a fundamental shift. America is abandoning its role as system administrator in favor of becoming just another self-interested great power. The consequences will be extensive and severe.
Security guarantees that prevented armed conflict will weaken. For decades, potential aggressors were deterred by the knowledge that attacking American allies would trigger U.S. intervention. With that credibility eroded, opportunistic powers will test boundaries. Taiwan is in greater danger of an invasion by China, and the Baltic states and other nations bordering Russia are more vulnerable.
Smaller states will increasingly become pawns in great-power competitions. During Pax Americana, small nations could navigate international relations with reasonable autonomy, protected by American-backed international norms. In the emerging multipolar system, these countries will face coercion from regional powers seeking to establish spheres of influence.
We’re already witnessing this dynamic with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s increasingly aggressive posturing in the South China Sea. Like circling sharks that smell blood in the water, hostile powers are preparing for a return to a world where, as Thucydides famously wrote, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Major wars between states will become much more common than it was over the last several decades.
Relatedly, the power imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear states will become more pronounced and dangerous. During Pax Americana, the U.S. nuclear umbrella protected allies, reducing incentives for nuclear proliferation. As this protection becomes unreliable, countries will face a stark choice: develop nuclear weapons or accept vulnerability. The result will likely be a cascade of nuclear proliferation, increasing the risk of miscalculation, accidents and regional arms races.
Economic prosperity will suffer as the integrated global economy fragments. The American-led order created ideal conditions for globalization: secure shipping lanes, predictable rules and relatively free trade. Without a great power enforcing these norms, protectionism will rise, supply chains will localize and economic efficiency will decline. The poorest nations, which benefited greatly from integration into global markets, will suffer most as investment retreats to safer havens. Wealthier nations will see a decline in their standard of living as access to markets with cheaper labor is blocked off.
The tragedy is that many Americans, frustrated by the costs of global leadership, fail to recognize the many indirect benefits they’ve received from it. It is true that American hegemony wasn’t free to maintain, but by bearing those costs we were able to maintain a world remarkably conducive to U.S. interests. The era of stable markets for exports, reliable access to resources and few direct security threats is ending as we walk away from our role as a relatively benevolent hegemon.
The coming disorder will hurt Americans more than they realize, through increased military threats and economic disruptions. Those celebrating America’s retreat from global leadership will soon learn that their wish was granted on a monkey’s paw. The world that follows Pax Americana will be poorer, more dangerous and less free — a harsh lesson in how much better the imperfect American-led order was than the alternatives that history offers.
Nicholas Creel is an associate professor of business law at Georgia College & State University. His views as expressed here are not necessarily those of any employer or other institution.
