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Europe has a choice: nukes now ... or learn to speak Russian.

Europe has two years, perhaps three at most, to arm itself sufficiently to have a chance to repel a Russian conventional military attack without the assistance of the United States before Russia's military recovers from the war in Ukraine. That's probably the amount of time they'll have to build a credible survivable nuclear retailiatory capability if the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to no longer provide them with protection.

I've already proposed that the Royal Navy re-fit their Astute-class nuclear-powered submarines, which can carry Tomahawk cruise missiles, with nuclear-armed Tomahawks. They'd have a range of 900 nautical miles (1,600 kilometers).

The Royal Navy isn't due to replace their Vanguard-class boomers until 2030s. The U.K.'s entire nuclear deterrent is sub-based. Britain currently keeps at least one Vanguard at sea at all times, but there are only four of them. One of them could turn most of Russia into a radioactive wasteland.

The French have both an air-based and sub-based nuclear deterrent, if you can even call it a deterrent. With only four subs and generally only one at sea like the British, the Russians will hunt those down quickly in a pre-emptive strike. And Putin's hypersonic missiles will give the French little time to get the birds in the air. France could also face a submarine-launched ballistic missle attack from both the North Sea, the Atlantic coast and/or the Med.

To be blunt, Europe cannot count on "regime change" in the U.S. political landscape in 2028. And Putin may elect to strike while Trump is still in office, knowing the U.S. will be indecisive at best on intervention.

The time to start building a survivable nuclear retailiatory capability is now. The most survivable and most cost-effective way is with nuclear-powered submarines that can hide from Russian attack subs. But in the short-term, due to the length of time to build them, would be to have round-the-clock nuclear bombers in the air so as not to be caught on the ground in a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike. That will scare the hell out of their citizens though. So the Europeans need to do more to publicize the daily near-incursions into European airspace by the Ruskies.

Other nations should reconsider their non-nuke stance, particularly Poland, since the country would be the prime first target of a Russian advance west from Belarus and occupied-Ukraine.
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WandererTony · 56-60, M
I have this strong feeling that the fear of Russian take over of the world is misplaced. The war at Ukraine is not an indicator that the Russians intend to take over all of Europe.
DeWayfarer · 61-69, M
@WandererTony the invasions of Georgia, Syria, Central Africa and Afghanistan on top of Crimea and Ukraine is cause!
beckyromero · 36-40, F
@WandererTony
I have this strong feeling that the fear of Russian take over of the world is misplaced. The war at Ukraine is not an indicator that the Russians intend to take over all of Europe.

Olga Timofeyeva: Which event in the Russian history would you like to undo?

Vladimir Putin: The collapse of the Soviet Union.

March 2, 2018

source: https://web.archive.org/web/20240908005705/http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56969
22Michelle · 70-79, T
@WandererTony It's more an indicator that Russia's " military might" is, and was, massively overestimated. Currently they'd struggle to take on Poland, let alone all of Europe. Whether they'd have the numbers of troops, without North Koreans, is a big enough question.
DeWayfarer · 61-69, M
@22Michelle troops are not the question as they have proven with North Korean troops. And there is always Chinese troops which they have yet to use.

Those three countries are an alliance. Russian fly overs on Taiwan proves this.
beckyromero · 36-40, F
@22Michelle
Currently they'd struggle to take on Poland, let alone all of Europe

Do you honestly think that an attack on a NATO country would be launched with the pathetically and poorly-planned invasion of Ukraine?

Moreover, if Russia occupies all of Ukraine, it would be able to attack Poland from the north (via Kaliningrad), east thru Belarus and the southeast via Ukraine.

Without NATO (and by that, I mean U.S. active military participation) Poland could no more defend itself against a full-scale invasion by Russia than it was able to against Nazi Germany in September 1939.

Russian decision-making prior to the invasion was almost entirely top down. Putin’s obsession with secrecy meant that consultations were limited to a small circle of trusted military advisors. Not even Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, was included in this group. He was informed of the invasion on 24 February, the day it took place. Russian field commanders on the ground in Belarus for military exercises had no idea that they would be leading an invasion. Publicly, Putin’s regime posed as nonbelligerent, even while it planned the invasion. As a result, neither the Russian people nor the Russian field commanders were expecting a war.

The obsession with secrecy came at a high cost: there was no opportunity for critiquing the invasion plan and no consideration of fallback strategies should something go wrong. Due to this lack of critique, “The plan itself, while theoretically plausible, compounded optimism bias in each of its stages. . . . There is no evidence in the Russian planning that anyone had asked what would happen if any of its key assumptions were wrong.”

Among these mistaken assumptions were that: (1) a high-speed invasion would demoralize the Ukrainian military, (2) the Russian military would defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, (3) the top Ukrainian leaders would be quickly captured and executed, (4) the vast majority of Ukrainians would either welcome the Russian invaders or remain passive, and (5) the large Russian intelligence network inside Ukraine would not be needed for military victory but only for post-victory pacification and control.

Putin’s invasion plan is that it violated the Sidorenko force requirements in Russian military field manuals. At the start of 2022, the Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, which, according to the 3:1 force ratio rule, would have required an invasion of 590,000 Russian personnel. Instead, the Russians planned an invasion with 190,000 personnel, actually smaller than the combined Ukrainian armed forces.

source:
Russia's War in Ukraine: Two Decisive Factors
Gilbert W. Merkx, PhD
Marine Corps University Press

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Russia's military expenditure is now higher than Europe's total defence spending, in terms of purchasing parity power. It's increased by 41% and is now the equivalent of 6.7% of GDP. In contrast, the UK will be spending just 2.5% by 2027.