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Peaceandnamaste · 26-30, F
@Lion1776 The Nazi flag was banned why not the Confederate flag.
eli1601 · 70-79, M
@Peaceandnamaste Are you sure about the nazi flag? I thought it was a free speech issue. After all, there are still American nazis.
BohemianBoo · M
@Peaceandnamaste The Nazi flag was only banned in countries where they have hate speech laws.
Graylight · 51-55, F
@BohemianBoo We have hate speech laws here.
Graylight · 51-55, F
@BohemianBoo Thank you, but I don't do research via internet videos. That said, you're absolutely right. While any state can and has enacted hate speech laws (see Mass), hate speech itself is not a crime in and of itself. Fascinating. It's a crucial distinction and closing some loopholes there might help. How can one be able in incite, indoctrinate, influence and command through speech and not be held accountable for the inevitable results of that speech?
BohemianBoo · M
@Graylight My answer is that it's just too grey. Pretty much any crime can be blamed on something that a public figured said. I agree with laws against very specific acts of speech, such as direct threats of violence, defamation of character, and false bomb threats. But hate speech laws are too broad and have generally been bad in every country that tried them.
Graylight · 51-55, F
@BohemianBoo But do they have to be? I agree that just because Trump said "go get 'em," he isn't necessarily responsible tor the action others took. However, if it can be proven that the speech was made, was deemed hateful by existing definitions, was heard by specific people or groups and was enacted or played out as a result of those ideas and speech, then a person may be guilty of using hate speech in order to incite violence.
But we have definitions of hate speech. According the the UN (and the Oxford dictionary), in common language, “hate speech” refers to offensive discourse targeting a group or an individual based on [i]inherent [/i]characteristics (such as race, religion or gender) and that may [i]threaten [/i]social peace.
Bhikhu Parekh (2012) lists the following instances as examples different countries have either punished or sought to punish as hate speech:
Shouting “[N-words] go home,” making monkey noises, and chanting racist slogans at soccer matches.
“Islam out of Britain. Protect the British people.”
“Arabs out of France.”
“Serve your country, burn down a mosque.”
“Blacks are inherently inferior, lecherous, predisposed to criminal activities, and should not be allowed to move into respectable areas.”
“Jews are conspiratorial, devious, treacherous, sadistic, child killers, and subversive; want to take over the country; and should be carefully watched.”
Distribution by a political party of leaflets addressed to “white fellow citizens” saying that, if it came to power, it would remove all Surinamese, Turks, and other “undesired aliens” from the Netherlands.
A poster of a woman in a burka with text that reads: “Who knows what they have under their sinister and ugly looking clothes: stolen goods, guns, bombs even?”
Speech that either denies or trivializes the holocaust or other crimes against humanity.
Robert Post’s four bases for defining hate speech might help us organize the features of Parekh’s list:
In law, we have to define hate speech carefully to designate the forms of the speech that will receive distinctive legal treatment. This is no easy task. Roughly speaking, we can define hate speech in terms of the harms it will cause—physical contingent harms like violence or discrimination; or we can define hate speech in terms of its intrinsic properties—the kinds of words it uses; or we can define hate speech in terms of its connection to principles of dignity; or we can define hate speech in terms of the ideas it conveys. Each of these definitions has advantages and disadvantages. Each intersects with the first amendment theory in a different way. In the end, any definition that we adopt must be justified on the ground that it will achieve the results we wish to achieve. (Herz and Molnar 2012, 31)
The four definitional bases are in terms of: (1) harm, (2) content, (3) intrinsic properties, i.e., the type of words used, and (4) dignity.
[i]https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hate-speech/#WhatHateSpee[/i]
But we have definitions of hate speech. According the the UN (and the Oxford dictionary), in common language, “hate speech” refers to offensive discourse targeting a group or an individual based on [i]inherent [/i]characteristics (such as race, religion or gender) and that may [i]threaten [/i]social peace.
Bhikhu Parekh (2012) lists the following instances as examples different countries have either punished or sought to punish as hate speech:
Shouting “[N-words] go home,” making monkey noises, and chanting racist slogans at soccer matches.
“Islam out of Britain. Protect the British people.”
“Arabs out of France.”
“Serve your country, burn down a mosque.”
“Blacks are inherently inferior, lecherous, predisposed to criminal activities, and should not be allowed to move into respectable areas.”
“Jews are conspiratorial, devious, treacherous, sadistic, child killers, and subversive; want to take over the country; and should be carefully watched.”
Distribution by a political party of leaflets addressed to “white fellow citizens” saying that, if it came to power, it would remove all Surinamese, Turks, and other “undesired aliens” from the Netherlands.
A poster of a woman in a burka with text that reads: “Who knows what they have under their sinister and ugly looking clothes: stolen goods, guns, bombs even?”
Speech that either denies or trivializes the holocaust or other crimes against humanity.
Robert Post’s four bases for defining hate speech might help us organize the features of Parekh’s list:
In law, we have to define hate speech carefully to designate the forms of the speech that will receive distinctive legal treatment. This is no easy task. Roughly speaking, we can define hate speech in terms of the harms it will cause—physical contingent harms like violence or discrimination; or we can define hate speech in terms of its intrinsic properties—the kinds of words it uses; or we can define hate speech in terms of its connection to principles of dignity; or we can define hate speech in terms of the ideas it conveys. Each of these definitions has advantages and disadvantages. Each intersects with the first amendment theory in a different way. In the end, any definition that we adopt must be justified on the ground that it will achieve the results we wish to achieve. (Herz and Molnar 2012, 31)
The four definitional bases are in terms of: (1) harm, (2) content, (3) intrinsic properties, i.e., the type of words used, and (4) dignity.
[i]https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hate-speech/#WhatHateSpee[/i]
BohemianBoo · M
@Graylight See, this is what I mean by too grey. I think it's okay to say something like "Islam has no place here" but not okay to say "Muslims have no place here." But because the line there is so subjective, I think it's wrong to make either statement illegal.
I'm against third world immigration for economic reasons. But anything I say on the issue could easily be twisted into "hate speech."
Now if someone was to say that we need to attack anyone who promotes religion or third world immigration, that I agree should be illegal, because there's a direct threat of violence. But we should be able to have conversations about controversial topics like immigration, religion, and racism.
I'm against third world immigration for economic reasons. But anything I say on the issue could easily be twisted into "hate speech."
Now if someone was to say that we need to attack anyone who promotes religion or third world immigration, that I agree should be illegal, because there's a direct threat of violence. But we should be able to have conversations about controversial topics like immigration, religion, and racism.