Flamboyant Cyber Operations Like the 'Pagers Attack' in Lebanon Are No Substitute for Strategy
Haaretz
Zvi Bar'el
Sep 18, 2024 1:52 pm IDT
In August 2020, Lebanon suffered a historic disaster with a huge explosion at the Beirut port. More than 7,000 people were injured and 300 killed, hundreds of thousands were rendered homeless, and the scope of the damage was estimated at $15 billion.
The scale of the damage and number of casualties from Tuesday's "pagers attack," which is attributed to Israel, is more than 2,800 injured and 12 dead to date. While far from the scale of the damage caused by the port explosion, that national trauma was recalled.
In planning such an attack, as is evidenced by its results so far, it would be impossible to assume that only Hezbollah activists, combatants, and "combat supporters" – including the sons of politicians and Iran's ambassador to Lebanon – would be harmed. This means that such an attack cannot be described as a "surgical strike."
The goal behind it is to create a "reality-changing" balance of terror and deterrence, going far beyond a demonstration of technological and intelligence capability, or an attempt to embarrass Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
Tactically, if Israel is indeed behind the attack as Lebanon claims, it deliberately deviated from the rules of the "response equation" that has dictated much of the violent dialogue between Israel and Hezbollah since October 8.
From these rules, which are based on the working assumption that neither side wants an all-out war, each party derived the depth of its strikes, the scope of damage to civilians, and the kind of munitions it used.
The symmetry of responses was not always kept, but any deviation from it, such as the killing of senior commanders – including Hezbollah general commander Fuad Shukr, Muhammad Naama Nasser, the commander of the western sector in southern Lebanon, or Wissam al-Tawil, the Radwan force commander, and many others – still kept to the basic structure of the confrontation.
Although Hezbollah and official Lebanese spokesmen are pointing the finger at Israel as the party responsible for the attack and even promised vengeance, Nasrallah still hasn't reclassified this strike in a way that would indicate an intention to leverage it as grounds for launching a wider war.
A mass casualty attack that causes extensive "collateral damage" not only seeds panic in the streets and markets where civilians were injured – it also creates national insecurity. The effect of such panic is well known in Israel, in its ability to create immense public pressure on the decision-makers.
But if the objective was to create a similar effect in Lebanon to motivate Hezbollah to stem its strikes, and especially to disconnect the Lebanon front from Gaza, that may turn out to be a far-reaching ambition.
For months, politicians, journalists and public figures have leveled public and political criticism at Hezbollah, but, to date, this criticism has not developed into a mass public protest of the kind that the Beirut port explosion or the severe economic crisis have caused.
The reason is that the confrontation with Israel is apparently seen as something that only affects southern Lebanon and partly the Beqaa Valley, with Beirut and other large cities remaining out of it.
It's doubtful that an electronic strike of this nature, even in the heart of Beirut and the Hezbollah stronghold of the Dahieh neighborhood, will change this perception, as it is still viewed as a targeted attack against Hezbollah and not one that impacts the broader population.
If, on the other hand, the goal of the attack was to undermine Nasrallah's confidence in his ability to use his full arsenal, especially weapons that require advanced communications channels, by demonstrating that they are hackable, it is doubtful we will see the group change its strategy as a result in this case either.
The variety of missiles, drones and other arms available to it, as well as the alternative communications networks that it has established over the years, suggest that the group wouldn't be paralyzed by an electronic strike.
But a wholesale action of this kind may send a clear message, not just to Hezbollah. One of the targets is Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. The accepted analysis is that a general conflict with Lebanon serves his objectives, since it would be a step towards fulfilling his vision of a multifront war against Israel.
Like Israel, Sinwar cannot be confident where a wide-scale war between Israel and Lebanon would lead. He cannot be confident that Iran would join such a war; Syria has already shown to be indifferent and largely neutral in the confrontation with Hamas; and while the Houthis are continuing their attacks in the Red Sea, they cannot land a decisive blow.
Most of all, Sinwar, like Israel, cannot know how long Hezbollah would persevere in a war of attrition against Israel if it turns out that it would jeopardize Iran's most important strategic asset in the Middle East.
Sinwar can and perhaps should assume that the "pagers strike" is a kind of "knock on the roof" – the last warning before a general war in Lebanon. Ostensibly, such a development conforms to his strategic interests, but it might actually push him to the margins and deprive him of the diplomatic power he currently holds over Israel.
It may not only dictate the terms of the hostage deal but the whole outline of Sinwar's control over the Gaza Strip, which depends on a cease-fire in Gaza.
A war in Lebanon might reinforce a sense of "unity of fronts," but in reality would disconnect Gaza from Lebanon. By opening a separate front between Israel and Lebanon, the latter would no longer be dependent on Sinwar's agenda.
This suggests that a war of attrition may better serve both Sinwar and Nasrallah than an all-out conflict between Israel and Lebanon.
This leads to the conclusion that if Israel – assuming it was responsible for the pager attack – believes that the strike is enough to sever the Lebanese and Gazan fronts, or at least convince Sinwar that such a split is imminent, that assessment might be questionable.
The pagers strike may be an impressive show of intelligence and technological capability, but it doesn't change the fact that Israel has only two strategic scenarios to choose from.
One is an all-out war, the scale of which, duration, and cost in lives and money are unknown, as well as its ability to achieve its planned objectives, including the safe return of Galilee residents to their homes.
The alternative is a deal with Sinwar to end the war in Gaza, secure the release of hostages, and achieve a cease-fire in the north.
While far from an ideal solution, it would eliminate many of the uncertainties tied to the option of full-scale war and, at the very least, begin to repay the heavy moral debt the Israeli government owes its people.
Zvi Bar'el
Sep 18, 2024 1:52 pm IDT
In August 2020, Lebanon suffered a historic disaster with a huge explosion at the Beirut port. More than 7,000 people were injured and 300 killed, hundreds of thousands were rendered homeless, and the scope of the damage was estimated at $15 billion.
The scale of the damage and number of casualties from Tuesday's "pagers attack," which is attributed to Israel, is more than 2,800 injured and 12 dead to date. While far from the scale of the damage caused by the port explosion, that national trauma was recalled.
In planning such an attack, as is evidenced by its results so far, it would be impossible to assume that only Hezbollah activists, combatants, and "combat supporters" – including the sons of politicians and Iran's ambassador to Lebanon – would be harmed. This means that such an attack cannot be described as a "surgical strike."
The goal behind it is to create a "reality-changing" balance of terror and deterrence, going far beyond a demonstration of technological and intelligence capability, or an attempt to embarrass Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
Tactically, if Israel is indeed behind the attack as Lebanon claims, it deliberately deviated from the rules of the "response equation" that has dictated much of the violent dialogue between Israel and Hezbollah since October 8.
From these rules, which are based on the working assumption that neither side wants an all-out war, each party derived the depth of its strikes, the scope of damage to civilians, and the kind of munitions it used.
The symmetry of responses was not always kept, but any deviation from it, such as the killing of senior commanders – including Hezbollah general commander Fuad Shukr, Muhammad Naama Nasser, the commander of the western sector in southern Lebanon, or Wissam al-Tawil, the Radwan force commander, and many others – still kept to the basic structure of the confrontation.
Although Hezbollah and official Lebanese spokesmen are pointing the finger at Israel as the party responsible for the attack and even promised vengeance, Nasrallah still hasn't reclassified this strike in a way that would indicate an intention to leverage it as grounds for launching a wider war.
A mass casualty attack that causes extensive "collateral damage" not only seeds panic in the streets and markets where civilians were injured – it also creates national insecurity. The effect of such panic is well known in Israel, in its ability to create immense public pressure on the decision-makers.
But if the objective was to create a similar effect in Lebanon to motivate Hezbollah to stem its strikes, and especially to disconnect the Lebanon front from Gaza, that may turn out to be a far-reaching ambition.
For months, politicians, journalists and public figures have leveled public and political criticism at Hezbollah, but, to date, this criticism has not developed into a mass public protest of the kind that the Beirut port explosion or the severe economic crisis have caused.
The reason is that the confrontation with Israel is apparently seen as something that only affects southern Lebanon and partly the Beqaa Valley, with Beirut and other large cities remaining out of it.
It's doubtful that an electronic strike of this nature, even in the heart of Beirut and the Hezbollah stronghold of the Dahieh neighborhood, will change this perception, as it is still viewed as a targeted attack against Hezbollah and not one that impacts the broader population.
If, on the other hand, the goal of the attack was to undermine Nasrallah's confidence in his ability to use his full arsenal, especially weapons that require advanced communications channels, by demonstrating that they are hackable, it is doubtful we will see the group change its strategy as a result in this case either.
The variety of missiles, drones and other arms available to it, as well as the alternative communications networks that it has established over the years, suggest that the group wouldn't be paralyzed by an electronic strike.
But a wholesale action of this kind may send a clear message, not just to Hezbollah. One of the targets is Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. The accepted analysis is that a general conflict with Lebanon serves his objectives, since it would be a step towards fulfilling his vision of a multifront war against Israel.
Like Israel, Sinwar cannot be confident where a wide-scale war between Israel and Lebanon would lead. He cannot be confident that Iran would join such a war; Syria has already shown to be indifferent and largely neutral in the confrontation with Hamas; and while the Houthis are continuing their attacks in the Red Sea, they cannot land a decisive blow.
Most of all, Sinwar, like Israel, cannot know how long Hezbollah would persevere in a war of attrition against Israel if it turns out that it would jeopardize Iran's most important strategic asset in the Middle East.
Sinwar can and perhaps should assume that the "pagers strike" is a kind of "knock on the roof" – the last warning before a general war in Lebanon. Ostensibly, such a development conforms to his strategic interests, but it might actually push him to the margins and deprive him of the diplomatic power he currently holds over Israel.
It may not only dictate the terms of the hostage deal but the whole outline of Sinwar's control over the Gaza Strip, which depends on a cease-fire in Gaza.
A war in Lebanon might reinforce a sense of "unity of fronts," but in reality would disconnect Gaza from Lebanon. By opening a separate front between Israel and Lebanon, the latter would no longer be dependent on Sinwar's agenda.
This suggests that a war of attrition may better serve both Sinwar and Nasrallah than an all-out conflict between Israel and Lebanon.
This leads to the conclusion that if Israel – assuming it was responsible for the pager attack – believes that the strike is enough to sever the Lebanese and Gazan fronts, or at least convince Sinwar that such a split is imminent, that assessment might be questionable.
The pagers strike may be an impressive show of intelligence and technological capability, but it doesn't change the fact that Israel has only two strategic scenarios to choose from.
One is an all-out war, the scale of which, duration, and cost in lives and money are unknown, as well as its ability to achieve its planned objectives, including the safe return of Galilee residents to their homes.
The alternative is a deal with Sinwar to end the war in Gaza, secure the release of hostages, and achieve a cease-fire in the north.
While far from an ideal solution, it would eliminate many of the uncertainties tied to the option of full-scale war and, at the very least, begin to repay the heavy moral debt the Israeli government owes its people.
