The 'Holy' Philadelphi Route Will Be Paved With Hostages' Bodies as Israel Reoccupies Gaza
Haaretz
Zvi Bar'el
Sep 3, 2024 2:47 pm IDT
Few Israelis needed Joe Biden's blunt "no" when he was asked if he believed that Benjamin Netanyahu was doing enough to achieve a hostage-release deal. Israelis have known the truth for months.
The prime minister didn't shoot the six hostages in the head last week, Hamas terrorists did. But Netanyahu systematically created the conditions that led to the murders.
It's warped, but Israel's control over the Philadelphi route – the Gaza-Egypt border – has been labeled "a diplomatic and strategic issue." And last week the security cabinet (except Defense Minister Yoav Gallant) duly voted to leave Israeli forces there. The chilling result became clear the following day in the dark tunnel where six hostages' bodies were found.
The security cabinet's decision reflects not only the ignominy of the dishrags who prioritized this hollow "strategy" over human life, as if it involved a holy site or a symbol of the return to the Promised Land. It also ignores the stance of the army and Shin Bet people who believe that Israel can forgo control over the route, certainly for a limited time. But most importantly, the decision maliciously ignores the route's history.
Maliciously, because it's impossible that no one in the security cabinet remembers that the army controlled the Philadelphi route before, and this didn't prevent Hamas' stockpiling of weapons and launching of attacks, including terror attacks. It's also impossible that no one in the security cabinet remembers that even when the army fully controlled Gaza between 1967 and 2005, the year of the pullout, Israel still got hit by mortar fire and Qassam rockets from the Strip.
According to data collected by rights group B'Tselem, the Shuvi women's group that supported the Gaza pullout, the Yesha Council of Jewish settlements and the Palestinian organization representing families of the dead, between 1967 and 2005, 230 Israelis and about 2,600 Palestinians were killed in Gaza. From December 1987, the beginning of the first intifada, until the signing of the Oslo I Accord six years later, 29 Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed. From 1993 to 2000, when the second intifada began, 39 Israelis were killed.
Over a year and a half, from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's announcement of his plan to leave Gaza until the actual pullout, 52 Israelis were killed in Gaza. And during the second intifada, about 500 rockets and 6,000 mortar shells were fired from the Strip. During that entire period, Israel had complete control not only over the Philadelphi route but over all of Gaza.
Under the army's nose, tunnels were dug and weapons, ammunition and fighters from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups were smuggled. They crossed to and from Sinai as if they were cruising down a highway.
Based on data analyzed by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terror Information Center, between 2000 and 2005, 15,057 terrorist attacks were carried out in Gaza or were carried out in Israel and launched from Gaza (compared with 9,495 for the West Bank).
People on the right talk about "the era of quiet" before the disengagement, when the army's presence in Gaza allegedly prevented terrorist attacks and missile fire. They also talk about "the era of war" that the disengagement allegedly has produced. This is a totally baseless, fraudulent narrative that the government and prime minister are trying to recycle and sell to the public.
Whether to stay or withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor is a key issue on which the hostages' fate turns. But when Netanyahu calls it "a diplomatic issue" or "strategic," these are rhetorical flourishes designed to overshadow the lives of several dozen people. And when he uses these phrases, he's portraying the route as a linchpin for a continued occupation of Gaza.
That's because it's impossible to control the Philadephi route without controlling the routes leading to it. And there's no way to defend the soldiers patrolling it without defending the adjacent spaces and neighborhoods – and southern Gaza is densely populated.
The Philadephi route isn't a goat path used by amateur hikers. The official reason for controlling it is to combat smuggling from Sinai to Gaza, but when Netanyahu and his cabinet resolved that the army would stay there, this became a whole package including an occupation. As Netanyahu put it, "We will stay in Gaza as long as necessary."
That's the "strategic" translation of controlling the corridor, for which the hostages can be sacrificed. Most of all, it's a sacred goal, because wherever the army is, settlements can be built, restoring the crown and glory.
Hamas understands this, Egypt fears it, the United States knows where the Philadelphi route is taking Israel, and, paradoxically, the hostage deal is the only factor that can save Israel from getting mired in Gaza's sands. But the hostages are an obstacle to realizing the strategy of returning to Gaza, and they will be sacrificed on the altar of the "corridor" that has become a symbol of alleged total security.
Proof that the army's presence doesn't guarantee security can be found in the argument that the West Bank settlers hurl: The army isn't protecting them. It's impossible to argue that the army isn't "present" in the West Bank, but weapons flow there from Jordan, are stolen from army bases, and reach terrorists through Israeli criminal gangs. Car bombs don't need advanced Iranian technology or rare-earth elements.
The first intifada developed and spread under the occupation when the army controlled the Philadelphi route, and the army's presence didn't prevent the kidnapping and murder of three teenagers in the West Bank in June 2014.
And the army's magic "presence" in Lebanon didn't help Galilee residents when Hezbollah launched hundreds of Katyushas and missiles into Israel in the '90s. The daily war in Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon, which lasted until 2000, wasn't enough. Israel had to launch two large campaigns, Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, to try to stem the rocket fire. Still, the barrages continued through 1999.
Israel isn't the only country that argued that a long-term occupation ensures security. On May 1, 2003, then-President George W. Bush gave a speech on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln under a banner declaring "Mission Accomplished."
"Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed" because "the regime [of Saddam Hussein] is no more," Bush said.
But in 2007, the United States was forced to send 20,000 more soldiers to Iraq as part of the "surge" strategy for fighting Al-Qaida, which had mobilized Sunni forces against the international coalition. The Americans only withdrew from Iraq in 2011 under an agreement that Bush signed with the Iraqi government in 2008, only to return in 2014 when the Islamic State seized parts of the country.
But the Americans at least had an exit strategy that relied on training an Iraqi army and police force that could handle the security problems (an army that failed at the start of the war against the Islamic State). The Americans also planned to rebuild the country's infrastructure and provide economic aid to the new Iraqi governments.
But Israel has no intention of establishing an alternative Palestinian government to Hamas, and the Philadelphi route will wind up a highway paved with the hostages bodies.
Zvi Bar'el
Sep 3, 2024 2:47 pm IDT
Few Israelis needed Joe Biden's blunt "no" when he was asked if he believed that Benjamin Netanyahu was doing enough to achieve a hostage-release deal. Israelis have known the truth for months.
The prime minister didn't shoot the six hostages in the head last week, Hamas terrorists did. But Netanyahu systematically created the conditions that led to the murders.
It's warped, but Israel's control over the Philadelphi route – the Gaza-Egypt border – has been labeled "a diplomatic and strategic issue." And last week the security cabinet (except Defense Minister Yoav Gallant) duly voted to leave Israeli forces there. The chilling result became clear the following day in the dark tunnel where six hostages' bodies were found.
The security cabinet's decision reflects not only the ignominy of the dishrags who prioritized this hollow "strategy" over human life, as if it involved a holy site or a symbol of the return to the Promised Land. It also ignores the stance of the army and Shin Bet people who believe that Israel can forgo control over the route, certainly for a limited time. But most importantly, the decision maliciously ignores the route's history.
Maliciously, because it's impossible that no one in the security cabinet remembers that the army controlled the Philadelphi route before, and this didn't prevent Hamas' stockpiling of weapons and launching of attacks, including terror attacks. It's also impossible that no one in the security cabinet remembers that even when the army fully controlled Gaza between 1967 and 2005, the year of the pullout, Israel still got hit by mortar fire and Qassam rockets from the Strip.
According to data collected by rights group B'Tselem, the Shuvi women's group that supported the Gaza pullout, the Yesha Council of Jewish settlements and the Palestinian organization representing families of the dead, between 1967 and 2005, 230 Israelis and about 2,600 Palestinians were killed in Gaza. From December 1987, the beginning of the first intifada, until the signing of the Oslo I Accord six years later, 29 Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed. From 1993 to 2000, when the second intifada began, 39 Israelis were killed.
Over a year and a half, from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's announcement of his plan to leave Gaza until the actual pullout, 52 Israelis were killed in Gaza. And during the second intifada, about 500 rockets and 6,000 mortar shells were fired from the Strip. During that entire period, Israel had complete control not only over the Philadelphi route but over all of Gaza.
Under the army's nose, tunnels were dug and weapons, ammunition and fighters from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups were smuggled. They crossed to and from Sinai as if they were cruising down a highway.
Based on data analyzed by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terror Information Center, between 2000 and 2005, 15,057 terrorist attacks were carried out in Gaza or were carried out in Israel and launched from Gaza (compared with 9,495 for the West Bank).
People on the right talk about "the era of quiet" before the disengagement, when the army's presence in Gaza allegedly prevented terrorist attacks and missile fire. They also talk about "the era of war" that the disengagement allegedly has produced. This is a totally baseless, fraudulent narrative that the government and prime minister are trying to recycle and sell to the public.
Whether to stay or withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor is a key issue on which the hostages' fate turns. But when Netanyahu calls it "a diplomatic issue" or "strategic," these are rhetorical flourishes designed to overshadow the lives of several dozen people. And when he uses these phrases, he's portraying the route as a linchpin for a continued occupation of Gaza.
That's because it's impossible to control the Philadephi route without controlling the routes leading to it. And there's no way to defend the soldiers patrolling it without defending the adjacent spaces and neighborhoods – and southern Gaza is densely populated.
The Philadephi route isn't a goat path used by amateur hikers. The official reason for controlling it is to combat smuggling from Sinai to Gaza, but when Netanyahu and his cabinet resolved that the army would stay there, this became a whole package including an occupation. As Netanyahu put it, "We will stay in Gaza as long as necessary."
That's the "strategic" translation of controlling the corridor, for which the hostages can be sacrificed. Most of all, it's a sacred goal, because wherever the army is, settlements can be built, restoring the crown and glory.
Hamas understands this, Egypt fears it, the United States knows where the Philadelphi route is taking Israel, and, paradoxically, the hostage deal is the only factor that can save Israel from getting mired in Gaza's sands. But the hostages are an obstacle to realizing the strategy of returning to Gaza, and they will be sacrificed on the altar of the "corridor" that has become a symbol of alleged total security.
Proof that the army's presence doesn't guarantee security can be found in the argument that the West Bank settlers hurl: The army isn't protecting them. It's impossible to argue that the army isn't "present" in the West Bank, but weapons flow there from Jordan, are stolen from army bases, and reach terrorists through Israeli criminal gangs. Car bombs don't need advanced Iranian technology or rare-earth elements.
The first intifada developed and spread under the occupation when the army controlled the Philadelphi route, and the army's presence didn't prevent the kidnapping and murder of three teenagers in the West Bank in June 2014.
And the army's magic "presence" in Lebanon didn't help Galilee residents when Hezbollah launched hundreds of Katyushas and missiles into Israel in the '90s. The daily war in Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon, which lasted until 2000, wasn't enough. Israel had to launch two large campaigns, Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, to try to stem the rocket fire. Still, the barrages continued through 1999.
Israel isn't the only country that argued that a long-term occupation ensures security. On May 1, 2003, then-President George W. Bush gave a speech on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln under a banner declaring "Mission Accomplished."
"Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed" because "the regime [of Saddam Hussein] is no more," Bush said.
But in 2007, the United States was forced to send 20,000 more soldiers to Iraq as part of the "surge" strategy for fighting Al-Qaida, which had mobilized Sunni forces against the international coalition. The Americans only withdrew from Iraq in 2011 under an agreement that Bush signed with the Iraqi government in 2008, only to return in 2014 when the Islamic State seized parts of the country.
But the Americans at least had an exit strategy that relied on training an Iraqi army and police force that could handle the security problems (an army that failed at the start of the war against the Islamic State). The Americans also planned to rebuild the country's infrastructure and provide economic aid to the new Iraqi governments.
But Israel has no intention of establishing an alternative Palestinian government to Hamas, and the Philadelphi route will wind up a highway paved with the hostages bodies.
