Quagmire is the nature of this war
Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.
If you listen to Russian President Vladimir Putin and even some U.S. policymakers, it sounds like Russia is marching to an inevitable battlefield victory in Ukraine. In a December 17, 2025, speech at the National Defence Control Center of the Russian Federation, President Putin remarked, “Our troops are advancing with confidence and grinding down the hostile forces, defeating enemy units, its groups forces and reserves, including so-called elite formations trained in Western centers and equipped with modern foreign weaponry.”1 Two days later in his annual end-of-year question and answer session, Putin noted that “ever since our forces drove the enemy from the Kursk Region, the strategic initiative has been firmly in the hands of the Russian Armed Forces. What does this mean? It means that our forces are advancing along the entire line of contact.2 Others have echoed this sentiment. As one U.S. policymaker noted, Russia has the “upper hand. And they always did. They’re much bigger. They’re much stronger. . . . At some point, size will win.”3
Yet a close look at the data suggests that Russia is hardly winning and, even more interestingly, that Russia is increasingly a declining power. To better understand the state of the war and Russia’s battlefield performance, this analysis asks: How successful has the Russian military been in achieving the Kremlin’s main objectives? What are the broader implications for the United States and Europe? To answer these questions, this assessment examines several indicators of Russia’s battlefield performance: fatality and casualty rates, the relative rate of advance of Russian forces, and the size of Russian territorial gains. The assessment also examines the state of Russia’s wartime economy, including long-term economic performance.
Russian forces have suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) and as many as 325,000 killed since February 2022.
The analysis has several main findings. First, Russian forces have suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) and as many as 325,000 killed since February 2022. No major power has suffered anywhere near these numbers of casualties or fatalities in any war since World War II. Second, Russian forces are advancing remarkably slowly on the battlefield. In the Pokrovsk offensive, for example, Russian forces advanced at an average rate of just 70 meters per day. This is slower than the most brutal offensive campaigns over the last century, including the notoriously bloody Battle of the Somme during World War I. Russian forces have gained less than 1.5 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2024. Third, Russia is becoming a second- or third-rate economic power. Its economy is showing strains because of the war, though it has not buckled. Russian manufacturing is declining, consumer demand is weakening, inflation remains stubbornly high, and the country faces a labor crunch. Economic growth slowed to 0.6 percent in 2025, and Russia continues to fall behind in key technologies such as AI.4 Russia had a grand total of zero companies in the top 100 list of technology companies in the world as measured by market capitalization.
The rest of this brief is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of Russian strategy—including ends and means—regarding the war in Ukraine. The second assesses Russian military and economic performance. And the third provides brief conclusions.
Russian Ends and Means
Effective strategy requires the alignment of ends, or objectives, and means to achieve those objectives.5 Putin’s primary objective is to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence, either directly by militarily conquering and annexing Ukraine (as Russia has done in some areas of eastern Ukraine) or indirectly by installing a Russian ally in Kyiv. In addition, Putin seeks to prevent further NATO expansion eastward, either through NATO membership or an expanding U.S. or European sphere of influence.
Putin has been clear and consistent in claiming—falsely—that Ukraine is not, and has never been, an independent country with a distinct culture, history, religion, or language. In his article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” Putin misleadingly noted that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians are descendants of Ancient Rus and “bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties . . . and—after the baptism of Rus—the Orthodox faith.”6 Putin continued that “there was no historical basis” for “the idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians.”7
After failing to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit by seizing Crimea in 2014 and then using a combination of regular and irregular military units in eastern Ukraine over the next several years, Putin resorted to a conventional invasion in February 2022. But the Russian military was unable to swiftly defeat Ukrainian forces through a blitzkrieg campaign and has resorted to a strategy of attrition warfare.
If you listen to Russian President Vladimir Putin and even some U.S. policymakers, it sounds like Russia is marching to an inevitable battlefield victory in Ukraine. In a December 17, 2025, speech at the National Defence Control Center of the Russian Federation, President Putin remarked, “Our troops are advancing with confidence and grinding down the hostile forces, defeating enemy units, its groups forces and reserves, including so-called elite formations trained in Western centers and equipped with modern foreign weaponry.”1 Two days later in his annual end-of-year question and answer session, Putin noted that “ever since our forces drove the enemy from the Kursk Region, the strategic initiative has been firmly in the hands of the Russian Armed Forces. What does this mean? It means that our forces are advancing along the entire line of contact.2 Others have echoed this sentiment. As one U.S. policymaker noted, Russia has the “upper hand. And they always did. They’re much bigger. They’re much stronger. . . . At some point, size will win.”3
Yet a close look at the data suggests that Russia is hardly winning and, even more interestingly, that Russia is increasingly a declining power. To better understand the state of the war and Russia’s battlefield performance, this analysis asks: How successful has the Russian military been in achieving the Kremlin’s main objectives? What are the broader implications for the United States and Europe? To answer these questions, this assessment examines several indicators of Russia’s battlefield performance: fatality and casualty rates, the relative rate of advance of Russian forces, and the size of Russian territorial gains. The assessment also examines the state of Russia’s wartime economy, including long-term economic performance.
Russian forces have suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) and as many as 325,000 killed since February 2022.
The analysis has several main findings. First, Russian forces have suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) and as many as 325,000 killed since February 2022. No major power has suffered anywhere near these numbers of casualties or fatalities in any war since World War II. Second, Russian forces are advancing remarkably slowly on the battlefield. In the Pokrovsk offensive, for example, Russian forces advanced at an average rate of just 70 meters per day. This is slower than the most brutal offensive campaigns over the last century, including the notoriously bloody Battle of the Somme during World War I. Russian forces have gained less than 1.5 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2024. Third, Russia is becoming a second- or third-rate economic power. Its economy is showing strains because of the war, though it has not buckled. Russian manufacturing is declining, consumer demand is weakening, inflation remains stubbornly high, and the country faces a labor crunch. Economic growth slowed to 0.6 percent in 2025, and Russia continues to fall behind in key technologies such as AI.4 Russia had a grand total of zero companies in the top 100 list of technology companies in the world as measured by market capitalization.
The rest of this brief is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of Russian strategy—including ends and means—regarding the war in Ukraine. The second assesses Russian military and economic performance. And the third provides brief conclusions.
Russian Ends and Means
Effective strategy requires the alignment of ends, or objectives, and means to achieve those objectives.5 Putin’s primary objective is to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence, either directly by militarily conquering and annexing Ukraine (as Russia has done in some areas of eastern Ukraine) or indirectly by installing a Russian ally in Kyiv. In addition, Putin seeks to prevent further NATO expansion eastward, either through NATO membership or an expanding U.S. or European sphere of influence.
Putin has been clear and consistent in claiming—falsely—that Ukraine is not, and has never been, an independent country with a distinct culture, history, religion, or language. In his article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” Putin misleadingly noted that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians are descendants of Ancient Rus and “bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties . . . and—after the baptism of Rus—the Orthodox faith.”6 Putin continued that “there was no historical basis” for “the idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians.”7
After failing to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit by seizing Crimea in 2014 and then using a combination of regular and irregular military units in eastern Ukraine over the next several years, Putin resorted to a conventional invasion in February 2022. But the Russian military was unable to swiftly defeat Ukrainian forces through a blitzkrieg campaign and has resorted to a strategy of attrition warfare.
