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James25 They don't present conflicting arguments since neither is an argument in of themselves, one is a methodology and the other is... well, again, defining religion as anything in-specific can be difficult, but it could be seen as a methodology itself or as a philosophy. Of course, sometimes its closer to a collection of social customs and ethical prescriptions. Neither of these is a totally universal definition of all religion, however.
As stated above, whilst religion surely *does* have instances of prescription, it isn't totally universal, since the broadness of religious diversity extends both inter-religiously and internally between various sects. Science also has various definitions too, perhaps ones more generalizable than does religion, but still ultimately various.
I'm not really sure why you're quoting at me what Epistemology is, I am the one who brought it up after all. I actually find it a little interesting that you're not really making arguments at all, you're just defining things "at me". Ironic, since whilst you're going on about how prescriptive religion is, you're actually yourself prescribing definitions about what these things are in total universality. A Scientist would gather definitions and instances and look for a descriptive definition, not prescribe a definition as you're going. Though, frankly, and again, quite ironically... your responses come off as little affirmations and mantras about what these things are.
Regardless, I am quickly becoming skeptical how much you actually know about the Scientific Method if you think that it includes interpretation inside of itself. A methodology is never an interpretation in of itself, since even if the methodology allows for us to enter the process of interpreting, that interpretation that comes afterwards is always distinct from the methodology that created it.
Finally, I'll elaborate on why the description of reality that Science provides could never logically *in of itself* disprove religion as some unified formulation. I'll be quoting the entire argument from Routledge's "Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction" by Keith E. Yandell (2002 Reprint) on pps. 344-346:
"A standard reply is that while perhaps this is so, no one can tell whether God exists or not, so there are just opinions and feelings about such matters. This reply typically is based on the idea that we can only know what science can tell us. The reply is particularly ill-founded, since
*We can only know what science can tell us* is not something science can tell us, so if the reply were sound it would itself be just a matter of the opinion and feelings of those who offered it. It may be worthwhile to put this point fully and formally, if briefly, as follows.
Scientism holds:
1 All explanation is scientific explanation.
Note that 1 is not itself justifiable by appeal to science alone; it is a view in theory of knowledge or epistemology – a piece of philosophy, not a piece of science, which neither presupposes it nor otherwise requires it. At this point it is useful to make a simplifying assumption to the effect that:
2 All scientific explanation is explanation in physics.
Almost certainly false, this is the view of traditional believers in the unity of science; if one wishes, one can replace “physics” in this argument by something like “physics, chemistry, biochemistry, biology, geology, and geography” or even by “natural science.”
3 Explanations in physics use no concepts and no laws save those of logic and physics.
4 All explanation is explanation in physics. (from 1 and 2)
5 All explanations use no concepts and no laws save those of logic and physics. (from 3 and 4)
Here, a reminder about explanations is relevant. Explanations have two parts. One part is an explicandum or to-be-explained – an explainee, if you like – that tells you what the explanation is an explanation of. This must be described in terms that are accessible to the other part of the explanation. The other part is an explicans or explainer that tells you what is the reason for the explainee; this by itself is often called “the explanation.” A genuine explainee is one that can be related to a genuine explainer. If, as premise 5 says, all explanations are explanations in physics, then all explainers can be described in all ways relevant to explanation only by the concepts of physics. Then all explainees must be related by the laws of physics to the explainers. Then for all purposes relevant to explanation the explainees must be described only by the concepts of physics.
6 For all purposes relevant to explanation, one needs nothing other than physical concepts and laws to explain or describe anything. (from 5)
7 Any (non-ultimate) property that a thing has is a property for which there is an explanation.
An ultimate property, defined in terms of the present argument, will be any property, defined in purely physical terms, that physical theory takes things to have but cannot explain their having.
8 One needs nothing to describe or explain any (non-ultimate) property that anything has except the laws and concepts of physics. (from 6, 7)
9 If one needs nothing other than physical concepts and laws to explain or describe any (non-ultimate) property, and all explanations are explanations in physics, then all of our knowledge is physical knowledge.
10 All of our knowledge is physical knowledge (knowledge in physics, fully expressible in terms of the concepts of physics). (from 8, 9)
Here, we reach the conclusion scientism requires. The problem is that the argument naturally continues as follows:
11 Reference only to physical descriptions and explanation of things will not justify us in thinking that something is an explanation, or in thinking that all of our knowledge is physical knowledge (knowledge in physics, fully expressible in terms of the concepts of physics).
12 If all of our knowledge is physical knowledge (knowledge in physics, fully expressible in terms of the concepts of physics) then all that we have to justify us in thinking that something is an explanation or that all of our knowledge is physical knowledge (knowledge in physics, fully expressible in terms of the concepts of physics) is reference only to physical descriptions and explanation of things.
13 If all of our knowledge is physical knowledge (knowledge in physics, fully expressible in terms of the concepts of physics) then all of our knowledge will not justify us in thinking that something is an explanation, or in thinking that all of our knowledge is physical knowledge (knowledge in physics, fully expressible in terms of the concepts of physics). (from 11, 12)
So scientism is self-defeating."
