I Am Not Gay, But I Respect Gay Rights
[big]Warning About Grindr[/big]
Grindr can tell anyone your exact location to room-level accuracy
A news story has reported that the developers of gay hook-up app Grindr have always claimed that the geo-locating functionality is vague enough to be convenient rather than unnerving. That may be true of the app itself, but the data it provides third parties can be easily exploited. By using a third-party search app users can locate Grindr users (with their photo and details) within minutes to an accuracy of 6 to 16 feet, with the potential to tie down users to a single room of a house.
It works through trilateration. In-app, Grindr will tell you that someone is “X feet away”, but by creating virtual accounts around the target, and then moving them closer and further away, a third-party app is able to get a more exact figure from the original data.
Although Grindr has disabled location tracking in countries where gay men face persecution like Russia, Nigeria, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, there are plenty of nations where it’s still enabled. In other words, gay men and trans people with Grindr accounts in Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, Abu Dhabi and the United States could be pinpointed by those looking to harass, arrest or much worse.
The potential for abuse is very high: Police or vigilante groups (e.g., political or religious anti-gay groups), parents of teens, religious school administrators (Catholic and Evangelical), opposition research, employers, etc. Until Grindr and similar sites are more secure and have policies and procedures to prevent third-party access, avoid using them if you are concerned about being "outed."
Grindr can tell anyone your exact location to room-level accuracy
A news story has reported that the developers of gay hook-up app Grindr have always claimed that the geo-locating functionality is vague enough to be convenient rather than unnerving. That may be true of the app itself, but the data it provides third parties can be easily exploited. By using a third-party search app users can locate Grindr users (with their photo and details) within minutes to an accuracy of 6 to 16 feet, with the potential to tie down users to a single room of a house.
It works through trilateration. In-app, Grindr will tell you that someone is “X feet away”, but by creating virtual accounts around the target, and then moving them closer and further away, a third-party app is able to get a more exact figure from the original data.
Although Grindr has disabled location tracking in countries where gay men face persecution like Russia, Nigeria, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, there are plenty of nations where it’s still enabled. In other words, gay men and trans people with Grindr accounts in Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, Abu Dhabi and the United States could be pinpointed by those looking to harass, arrest or much worse.
The potential for abuse is very high: Police or vigilante groups (e.g., political or religious anti-gay groups), parents of teens, religious school administrators (Catholic and Evangelical), opposition research, employers, etc. Until Grindr and similar sites are more secure and have policies and procedures to prevent third-party access, avoid using them if you are concerned about being "outed."
