Iran has suspended cooperation with the IAEA indefinitely. "This isn't just a mere pause."
The IAEA's descent
Tehran's damning indictment paints a picture of an agency that has catastrophically abandoned its mandate. The core assertion is stark: the IAEA, particularly under Director General Rafael Grossi, has morphed into a dual-purpose instrument of espionage and political coercion, serving the agendas of Washington, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Berlin. This transformation is evident in a chain of destructive actions:
I. Politicized reporting as pretext
Grossi's May report on Iran, while later conceding in a CNN interview that the IAEA possessed "no evidence or indication that Iran's nuclear program was moving toward weaponization," was laced with ambiguity and unverified assertions.
Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, contend this was deliberate: "Through this malign action, [Grossi] directly facilitated the adoption of a politically-motivated resolution against Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) as well as the unlawful Israeli and U.S. bombings of Iranian nuclear sites. In an astounding betrayal of his duties, he has additionally failed to explicitly condemn such blatant violations of IAEA safeguards and its Statute."
This June 12 BoG resolution, pushed by the E3 (UK, France, Germany) and the US, became the diplomatic fig leaf for aggression.
II. Enabling war through omission and action
Tehran sees a direct line from Grossi's flawed report and the subsequent BoG resolution to the military attacks.
The June 13 Israeli strikes and the June 22 U.S. bombardment were not just violations of international law and the UN Charter, but, in Iran's view, the physical manifestation of a process the IAEA enabled.
Critically, Grossi’s refusal to condemn these brazen attacks on safeguarded facilities—a flagrant breach of the Agency’s safeguards agreements and Statute—amounts to tacit endorsement and renders him complicit in the offenses.
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei articulated the depth of the betrayal: "We had a modest expectation from the IAEA, the Director General, and the BoG to unequivocally condemn the Israeli and American attacks on our peaceful nuclear facilities. This condemnation did not occur, and we still expect them to do so. It is their responsibility to respond to such injustices."
This follows Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami’s formal correspondence condemning Grossi.
III. Post-attack access: Espionage masquerading as safeguards?
Iran views Grossi's immediate demands for access to the bombed sites with profound suspicion and alarm.
Framed as necessary for safeguards verification, Tehran decodes these requests as thinly-veiled intelligence-gathering missions for the very aggressors who carried out the strikes.
Based on Grossi’s abysmal past performance, the objectives appear chillingly clear:
- Damage assessment for the aggressors: Providing the U.S. and Israel with detailed, on-the-ground evaluations of the effectiveness of their strikes – critical intelligence they currently lack.
Despite boasts from figures like U.S. President Donald Trump claiming the sites were "obliterated," U.S. and Israeli intelligence face a black hole regarding the actual damage inflicted, as evident by Washington’s Defense Intelligence Agency’s leaks to their stenographers masquerading as journalists in CNN and the New York Times. The IAEA's access would help them assess the extent of the damage to report back to the aggressors.
- The uranium hunt: Discovering the current location of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU), which the AEOI explicitly stated was moved before the attacks. Pinpointing this material is a top priority for Western and Israeli intelligence, determined to stop Iran’s civilian nuclear program.
- Targeting intel for future strikes: Gathering granular intelligence on Iran's reconstituted civilian nuclear program – its vulnerabilities, new locations, defensive measures – to facilitate planning for potential future military action.
Thus, from Iran’s point of view, granting access to the same organization that actively facilitated the recent, unprovoked bombardments now amounts to inviting the very spies who orchestrated the attack back in to blueprint future assaults on your vital civilian infrastructure.
Sources:
https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/02/middleeast/iran-suspending-cooperation-iaea-intl
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/515233/CIA-and-Mossad-Blinded
Tehran's damning indictment paints a picture of an agency that has catastrophically abandoned its mandate. The core assertion is stark: the IAEA, particularly under Director General Rafael Grossi, has morphed into a dual-purpose instrument of espionage and political coercion, serving the agendas of Washington, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Berlin. This transformation is evident in a chain of destructive actions:
I. Politicized reporting as pretext
Grossi's May report on Iran, while later conceding in a CNN interview that the IAEA possessed "no evidence or indication that Iran's nuclear program was moving toward weaponization," was laced with ambiguity and unverified assertions.
Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, contend this was deliberate: "Through this malign action, [Grossi] directly facilitated the adoption of a politically-motivated resolution against Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) as well as the unlawful Israeli and U.S. bombings of Iranian nuclear sites. In an astounding betrayal of his duties, he has additionally failed to explicitly condemn such blatant violations of IAEA safeguards and its Statute."
This June 12 BoG resolution, pushed by the E3 (UK, France, Germany) and the US, became the diplomatic fig leaf for aggression.
II. Enabling war through omission and action
Tehran sees a direct line from Grossi's flawed report and the subsequent BoG resolution to the military attacks.
The June 13 Israeli strikes and the June 22 U.S. bombardment were not just violations of international law and the UN Charter, but, in Iran's view, the physical manifestation of a process the IAEA enabled.
Critically, Grossi’s refusal to condemn these brazen attacks on safeguarded facilities—a flagrant breach of the Agency’s safeguards agreements and Statute—amounts to tacit endorsement and renders him complicit in the offenses.
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei articulated the depth of the betrayal: "We had a modest expectation from the IAEA, the Director General, and the BoG to unequivocally condemn the Israeli and American attacks on our peaceful nuclear facilities. This condemnation did not occur, and we still expect them to do so. It is their responsibility to respond to such injustices."
This follows Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami’s formal correspondence condemning Grossi.
III. Post-attack access: Espionage masquerading as safeguards?
Iran views Grossi's immediate demands for access to the bombed sites with profound suspicion and alarm.
Framed as necessary for safeguards verification, Tehran decodes these requests as thinly-veiled intelligence-gathering missions for the very aggressors who carried out the strikes.
Based on Grossi’s abysmal past performance, the objectives appear chillingly clear:
- Damage assessment for the aggressors: Providing the U.S. and Israel with detailed, on-the-ground evaluations of the effectiveness of their strikes – critical intelligence they currently lack.
Despite boasts from figures like U.S. President Donald Trump claiming the sites were "obliterated," U.S. and Israeli intelligence face a black hole regarding the actual damage inflicted, as evident by Washington’s Defense Intelligence Agency’s leaks to their stenographers masquerading as journalists in CNN and the New York Times. The IAEA's access would help them assess the extent of the damage to report back to the aggressors.
- The uranium hunt: Discovering the current location of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU), which the AEOI explicitly stated was moved before the attacks. Pinpointing this material is a top priority for Western and Israeli intelligence, determined to stop Iran’s civilian nuclear program.
- Targeting intel for future strikes: Gathering granular intelligence on Iran's reconstituted civilian nuclear program – its vulnerabilities, new locations, defensive measures – to facilitate planning for potential future military action.
Thus, from Iran’s point of view, granting access to the same organization that actively facilitated the recent, unprovoked bombardments now amounts to inviting the very spies who orchestrated the attack back in to blueprint future assaults on your vital civilian infrastructure.
Sources:
https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/02/middleeast/iran-suspending-cooperation-iaea-intl
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/515233/CIA-and-Mossad-Blinded
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